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Abstract 
Mobile devices have evolved from an accessory to the primary computing device for an 
increasing portion of the general population.  Not only is mobile the primary device, 
consumers on average have multiple Internet-connected devices.  The trend towards 
mobile has resulted in a shift to “mobile-first” strategies for delivering information and 
services in business organizations, universities, and government agencies. Though 
principles for good security design exist, those principles were formulated based upon the 
traditional workstation configuration instead of the mobile platform.  Security design 
needs to follow the shift to a “mobile-first” emphasis to ensure the usability of the 
security interface.   
 
The mobile platform has constraints on resources that can adversely impact the usability 
of security.  This research sought to identify design principles for usable security for 
mobile devices that address the constraints of the mobile platform.  Security and usability 
have been seen as mutually exclusive.  To accurately identify design principles, the 
relationship between principles for good security design and usability design must be 
understood.  The constraints for the mobile environment must also be identified, and then 
evaluated for their impact on the interaction of a consumer with a security interface.   
 
To understand how the application of the proposed mobile security design principles is 
perceived by users, an artifact was built to instantiate the principles.  Through a series of 
guided interactions, the importance of proposed design principles was measured in a 
simulation, in human-computer interaction, and in user perception.  The measures 
showed a resounding difference between the usability of the same security design 
delivered on mobile vs. workstation platform.  It also reveals that acknowledging the 
constraints of an environment and compensating for the constraints yields mobile security 
that is both usable and secure.  Finally, the hidden cost of security design choices that 
distract the user from the surrounding environment were examined from both the security 
perspective and public safety perspective.  
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
1.1 Introduction and Problem Statement 
      Access to digital information is no longer reserved to an elite minority of scholars 
and businesses—the Internet has put access in hands of the general public (Yang & 
Zhiyong, 2010). From environmental information to e-government services to phone 
directories, information delivery and interaction has shifted from print to exclusively 
electronic (Kirk, Chiagouris, & Gopalakrishna, 2011).  The accelerated movement of 
service to e-only delivery makes technology a necessity for all instead of a non-essential 
luxury item (Kim, Lee, & Menon, 2009). 
       Increasingly, mobile devices have moved from being companion devices of a 
computer workstation (Myers, 2005) to being the primary or stand-alone device for 
digital information access (West & Mace, 2009).  Computer crime, already a problem on 
the traditional workstation (Brenner, 2007; Lawton, 2007), has followed computer users 
to the mobile platform (Salerno, Sanzgiri, & Upadhyaya, 2011).  A mobile computing 
platform provides challenges in security that differ from the traditional computing 
workstation (Oberheide & Jahanian, 2010), and the structured work environment (Green, 
2007).  The challenges include designing sufficiently usable security to match the needs 
and capabilities of the users of these devices.   
1.2 Problem Statement and Argument 
       The research objective is to identify effective principles to design usable security 
for mobile devices.  Principles exist for achieving a good security design for information 
systems (Saltzer & Schroeder, 1975), as well as for usability design of information 
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systems (Shneiderman et al.,  2016).  These principles do not exist in a consolidated 
framework, making the application of either one (Boivie, Gulliksen, & Göransson, 2006) 
or both in a coordinated effort uncommon (Rehman & Mustafa, 2009).  Furthermore, 
these principles were developed for information systems in the context of a stationary 
workstation instead of the mobile devices (Botha, Furnell, & Clarke, 2008).  The two 
environments are significantly different in application design capabilities as well as 
hardware (Burigat, Chittaro, & Gabrielli, 2008).  The design of security on the mobile 
device is equally impacted by the platform and hardware of mobile devices as are other 
applications (Oberheide & Jahanian, 2010).  Usable security is demanded by the typical 
user community of mobile devices for e-banking and other financial applications (Weir, 
Douglas, Richardson, & Jack, 2010). 
       To effectively design these principles, attention must be paid to the effort required 
of the user to follow security (Yuan, Archer, Connelly, & Zheng, 2010), appropriate 
security for the value of the information (Grawemeyer & Johnson, 2011) , and the 
resource constraints of the devices in terms of physical form factors (Mittal & Sengupta, 
2009) and device capabilities (Shih & Wang, 2011). 
     The key to satisfying these needs is design that unifies both security and 
usability principles (Cranor & Garfinkel, 2005).  Systems designed with security 
and usability principles remain more secure, because the users do not circumvent 
security for functionality (Albrechtsen & Hovden, 2009).   
      Security is frequently an add-on (Baskerville, 1993).  Usability is 
similarly an add-on (Garfinkel, 2005).  In both cases, the lack of integration of 
security and usability into the bedrock of the design makes both less effective.  
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Beyond this similar disrespect, there is a deeper relationship between security and 
usability.  Lack is of usability is a form of security (Sasse, Brostoff, & Weirich, 
2001).  The most secure system is one that never breached, but not necessarily 
used.  The reverse can also be true: the removal of complicated security protocols 
can make a system extremely usable.  System design can turn into a tug-of-war 
between the two extremes, with many systems designers choosing to trade off 
usability for security and vice versa (Faily & Flechais, 2010).  
      Closer examination of secure design principles, such as those proposed by 
Saltzer and Schroeder (1975), and usability principles documented by 
Shneiderman et al. (2016), may reveal a relationship between security and 
usability principles.  For example, a streamlined design with an efficient interface 
can offer both good security and high usability, if it is possible to follow a 
combined set of design principles.   
       Security that is designed with usability does not trigger users’ natural 
aversion to systems that make them trade off functionality for security (Stanton, 
Stam, Mastrangelo, & Jolton, 2005).  One of the ways used to address the 
aversion to confusing security measures is security awareness training (Horcher & 
Tejay, 2009; Shaw, Chen, Harris, & Huang, 2009).  For the non-organizational 
user of mobile devices, there is no formal oversight or compensating training 
(Poole, Chetty, Morgan, Grinter, & Edwards, 2009).  The user depends upon an 
informal network of resources of varying quality and security knowledge.   
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1.3 Contribution to the Body of Knowledge – Dissertation Goal 
      While security and usability have been addressed, both separately and together, 
the previous focus has been on conventional workstations (Oberheide & Jahanian, 2010) 
or specific instances of mobile security (Weir, et al., 2010).  Instead of a case by case 
basis, this study proposes a series of design principles that apply across mobile devices as 
a group.  
      Garfinkel (2005) most clearly documented the gap in the literature on secure and 
usable design.  Garfinkel proposed the use of design patterns for secure operations.  
These patterns, such as “least surprise” and “disable by default” are almost too simple to 
be respected.  The common sense of using good defaults is most obvious in hindsight.  
The dissertation also calls for new defaults to address the burgeoning need for combined 
security and usability on mobile platforms.  Patterns are a step towards understanding 
security as a dimension of usability and vice versa. 
1.4 The Importance of the Research Problem  
      Usability in information system security design reduces the effort needed to 
follow secure practices, similar to how usability reduces the effort to use websites and 
even items of a user’s normal environment (Norman, 2004).  Users typically choose 
functionality over security when security becomes a barrier to getting the job done 
(Albrechtsen & Hovden, 2009); therefore, adding usability to a security design should 
reduce the need to choose functionality over security (Furnell, 2008).  A combined 
security-usability design framework reduces the effort needed to add security, and 
security designer does not choose security functionality over system usability (Whitten & 
Tygar, 1999).   
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1.4.1 The Challenge of Usability 
Computer systems have moved outside the context of business and research 
organizations to become an essential part of the home (Mazurek et al., 2010).  In the 
home the traditional support structure, with a dedicated Information Technology expert, 
is not the norm (Poole et al., 2009).  For the home user, there are no organization 
resources to compensate for difficult security.  Too much security and the users run the 
risk of not having access to their own devices.  The home user seeks informal support 
through a personal network, or systems that provide a highly positive user experience 
with usability, such as the Apple iPhone (Arruda-Filho, Cabusas, & Dholakia, 2010), and 
need less support.   
1.4.2 Dealing with More Devices per User 
       Mobile devices have increased the convenience of computing, and also the variety 
of an individual user’s computing experience (Oulasvirta & Sumari, 2007).  A typical 
information worker may manipulate a laptop, a cell phone, several hard drives, and a 
portable music player in the course of the work day (gAshbrook & Lyons, 2010).  Each 
device adds a degree of complexity with its own security mechanism and information 
management structure.  
      The interoperability of multiple mobile devices through a network can improve 
the sharing of information (Walker, Stanton, Jenkins, & Salmon, 2009).  Ebook readers 
such as the Amazon Kindle and the Barnes & Noble Nook have used this interoperability 
to move content seamlessly between platforms and increase user acceptance through 
usability (Horcher & Cohen, 2011).  Though ebooks and ebook readers had been 
available for over a decade, surmounting the content acquisition barrier with a common 
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repository in the cloud, and a non-intrusive authentication mechanism made the media 
and devices accessible to a wider community.  Applying consistent usability-security 
could induce the same user satisfaction and acceptance of security on the multiple mobile 
devices.  
1.4.3 More Sensitive Information on Mobile 
       Mobile devices have become so multi-functional that access controls are needed 
to protect the users’ information on the device, and provide secure authentication to the 
systems interfaced to by the device (Pasquinucci, 2009).  To provide the ease of use 
needed for user adoption, these controls must take into account the in-motion 
environment where the device will be used (Barnard, Yi, Jacko, & Sears, 2005, 2007; 
Chang, 2010) and the form factors of the mobile device (Chang, 2010).  Instead of simply 
transferring methods designed for the form factors of a standard-sized keyboard and 
screen, the security methods need to optimize and exploit the capabilities of the device 
(Botha et al., 2008).  
       The current authentication mechanisms such as the PIN or complex passwords, 
which are exponentially more difficult to input on the mobile keyboard, generate 
increased user pushback and induce the typical trade-off between functionality and 
security (Furnell, Clarke, & Karatzouni, 2008).  Since the portability of the device makes 
loss more probable, plus the increasing value of the information stored on mobile devices 
and the increasing dependence of users on their mobile devices, the loss or compromise 
of mobile devices has financial, reputation, and emotional repercussions (Chen & Katz, 
2009).   
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      The mismatch of traditional security procedures with mobile capabilities is typical 
of design that is not centered on the human element.  Understanding how humans interact 
with the device in an anthropometric context, which includes hand size, dexterity, and 
gender (Bylund & Burström, 2006), and situational context (e.g., in-motion, while 
performing other device activities) is key to determining which current authentication 
methods are optimal for mobile devices and what human-centered design elements affect 
securing mechanisms (Hwang, Cho, & Park, 2008). 
      In addition to the proliferation of computing devices, the resource-constraints of 
mobile devices have further complicated the design of both security and usability.  Unlike 
desktop workstations, every micrometer of internal space, every inch of screen real 
estate, and every amp of power is at a premium (Rahmati & Zhong, 2009). 
1.5 Scope and Definitions of Terms  
     The following terms are used for this study. 
 Information Security: A well-informed sense of assurance that information risks 
and controls are in balance (Anderson, 2003).  Risks are based on the context of 
the information.  What is secure in a small organization may not be in a large 
organization.  Keeping the controls in balance speaks to the trade-off between 
security and accessibility.  The “well-informed sense” requires the 
implementation of controls using a deep understanding of the goals of the 
organization or situation being protected.  
 Information System: All information handling activities at the technical, formal 
and informal levels of an organization (Liebenau & Backhouse, 1990).  Formal 
levels of an organization are marked by regulation and explicit consequences.  
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Information handling done by imitation or unconscious observation is at an 
informal level.  Explicit transfer of information from teacher to student is typical 
of technical information handling. 
 Mobile Devices: mobile devices refers to hand-held cellular communication 
devices.  These devices primarily consist of smart phones and tablets.  Mobile 
devices not included are laptop computers, portable hard drives, USB thumb 
drives, and portable music players (Hosmer et al., 2011). 
 Usability: the extent to which a product can be used by specified users to achieve 
specified goals with effectiveness, efficiency, and satisfaction in a specified 
context of use (Jokela, Iivari, Matero, & Karukka, 2003). 
 Security-usability (or usable security):  usability that relates specifically to the 
security interface (Cranor and Garfinkel, 2005). 
1.6 Research Questions 
      This study has two specific research questions that seek to address how to better 
design usable security for mobile devices. The first research question is: 
Research Question 1 – How does the overlap or conflict between security and usability 
impact the design of effective usable security on mobile devices?  
Design principles for usability are well-known within the HCI community.  Security 
design principles are lesser known both within the HCI community and the security 
community.  Even less acknowledged is the difference between usability of the security 
component of a system or device, and the usability of primary components of the system 
or device. 
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Another concern is whether it is possible to apply a new set of design principles in 
an effective way; therefore, the second research question is: 
Research Question 2 – Will a set of design principles structured to conserve constrained 
resource attain security usability? 
Approaching this question creates a need to define meaningful measures of usability and 
security.   
1.7 Structure of the Dissertation  
This dissertation is organized into five main chapters:  introduction, literature 
review, research methodology, results and discussion.  The introduction is the first 
chapter of this dissertation and provides an introduction to the proposed study.  Topics 
addressed in the introduction include why usability and security should be researched as a 
combination and why the mobile platform is of significance.  Next, the research problem 
is presented along with the underlying argument, its relevancy and its significance for 
research.  The research questions are then presented and discussed along with how the 
research questions support the research problem.  A brief set of definitions follows.  
Finally a review of the overall structure of this dissertation is presented.  
      The next chapter of the dissertation reviews the research literature that is relevant 
to usability and security.  First previous work in security design is reviewed.  Then 
usability research related to form factors is discussed.  The difference between mobile vs. 
fixed computing environments in terms of security design is discussed, followed a 
summary of user behavior research related to security and functionality.  
       The review of literature chapter then discusses what is known about human 
computer interfaces on mobile devices, security and mobile devices, and the gaps in the 
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extant literature.  Once the gaps are clearly identified then the significant contributions 
this research makes to the existing body of knowledge is presented. This chapter 
concludes with a brief summary.  
      The next chapter of the dissertation presents the research methodology and 
theoretical basis for the study.  The research methodology begins with an overview of 
design science research as it was originally conceived (Hevner, March, Park, & Ram, 
2004) and how design science research has been applied in recent studies (Venable, 
2010).  A high level view of the research method is outlined with the steps required to 
accomplish the research study.   
 The fourth chapter of the dissertation presents the results of the study.  The 
demographic information about participants is covered.  The results section is divided 
into the three phases that were described in the methodology, with the hypotheses that 
were evaluated in each individual phase linked to their results. 
 The final chapter discusses the meaning of the results, the importance of the 
results, and the contribution to the literature.  Future research suggested by the results is 
also discussed.  
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2. Chapter 2 
Chapter 2 
Review of the Literature 
     The review of literature is comprised of four sections that provides the theoretical 
basis for this study.  The first section reviews the current state of security design and best 
practices. The next section reviews the current research in human computer interfaces 
(HCI).  The third section reviews the differences and challenges in developing for the 
mobile platform, particularly in the area of resource conservation.  Finally, the fourth 
identifies the gap in the literature that this study attempts to address.   
2.1 Security Design 
      The need for new security techniques to address the brave new reality of mobile 
and pervasive computing has several root causes (Oberheide & Jahanian, 2010).  In some 
cases the lessons learned from desktop security are just as valid for the mobile platforms.  
In others the new platform has challenges due to resource constraints that make a classic 
technique inappropriate.   
      After a series of studies in the early nineties Baskerville (1993) proclaimed human 
error was the greatest problem in security.  These studies also show the reluctance of 
companies and individual users to reveal mistakes that caused security breaches.  The 
evidence continues to suggest that humans are not getting smarter about computers and 
security (Flechais & Sasse, 2009).  Designing for this weakest link in the security 
structure yields a better result than training the human to exhibit less usable behavior 
(Ng, Kankanhalli, & Xu, 2009; Sasse et al., 2001).  Using a checklist can predict 
12 
 
  
 
vulnerabilities in systems (Farahmand, Navathe, Enslow, & Sharp, 2003), but usability 
can pre-dispose a system to have less incidents.   
     Modeling languages to represent security requirements have been proposed to 
streamline the design process (Hatebur, Heisel, Jorjens, & Schmidt, 2011).  Giving 
designers a language to express security design concepts improves communication in the 
design process.  Another approach is to create security monitoring devices that are more 
usable (Davies & Tryfonas, 2009).  Instead of requiring the security practitioner to 
engineer the scan through a series of command line prompts, the interface presents in a 
web browser with full-screen output. 
2.2 Human Computer Interface (HCI) for Mobile Devices 
       Waves of new technology bring an accompanying amnesia of human-centered 
design principles.  Human-centered design, instead of technology-centered design, will 
produce devices that will be accepted, effective, and even loved by the owner, because 
they satisfy a functional need and elicit an emotional response (Norman, 2004).  Mobile 
and wearable devices have become a part of everyday life to the point where an 
individual is emotionally dependent on the device (Chen & Katz, 2009), and financially 
dependent on the security of the device (Hwang et al., 2008). 
      Acceptance and usability of mobile/wearable devices depends on design based on 
user requirements accurately reflecting human interaction with the device, even where the 
population is not homogeneous.  Gender, age, and capability differences drive how 
humans interact with devices, including mobile and wearable devices (Schwanen, Kwan, 
& Ren, 2008).  “One size fits all” is particularly ineffectual in biometric-based 
applications (Hunter, 2004).  Similarly, requirements for mobile and wearable need to 
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reflect physical and particularly biometric differences where those differences affect key 
design components.  
2.2.1 HCI and mobile device usage 
      Current research on mobile device design is centered on the functionality of the 
internals of the mobile device, as opposed to the form factors of the external device.  
College students are a mobile population with high dependency on their mobile devices 
(Chen & Katz, 2009).  Mobile devices provide direct and private communication that is 
easily available because the device is carried on their person.  Similarly, the features that 
college students prize in their mobile devices extend past communication to auxiliary 
activities like email, music players, organization and reminder activities, and even style 
(Economides & Grousopoulou, 2009).  The trend continues to evolve toward combining 
individual electronic devices into one multi-functional device that retains a compact 
footprint.  
     College students show some gender differences on mobile device usage.  In 
particular, the female respondents were less concerned about price (Economides & 
Grousopoulou, 2009).  The buying power of women is a significant factor in the 
economy, as women have become the largest growing market of consumers.  Designing 
products that appeal to women’s need to simplify, or reclaim time, is an economic 
advantage (Silverstein, Sayre, & Butman, 2009).  
     Similarly, the functionality requirements of the mobile professional have been 
assessed (Gebauer, 2008).  The functionality of mobile devices, even with usability 
issues, was preferred over the non-mobile counterpart.  Using the task technology fit 
(TTF) theory, Gebauer (2008) mapped the task to its non-mobile equivalent to measure 
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how well the device performed.  The results actually showed a mutation of the task when 
in the mobile environment, with the users performing the tasks for different reasons, and 
in a different manner.  The form factors of weight and size, which are not the focus of the 
TTF theory, play a prominent role in the success and user acceptance of the device.  
     The need for specialized versions of tools in the mobile environment also creates 
a disparity with the non-mobile equivalent (Economou, Gavalas, Kenteris, & Tsekouras, 
2008).  The authoring tools of the non-mobile platform need special versions to be able to 
create applications at all, and in particular ones that suit the smaller keyboard, lower 
processing speed and limited storage of the mobile device.  In some ways it is the 
equivalent of returning to the early days of computing when every byte of storage was 
rationed, and every computing cycle was optimized to use the least amount of processing.  
      Tourist information, mapping, and global positioning satellite (GPS) applications 
(Kenteris, Gavalas, & Economou, 2009) are capabilities most needed by uses who uses 
the mobile device to navigate in real time, while acquiring new information about the 
surrounding environment.  The concept of the mobile web browser was originally 
proposed for the Apple Newton PDA in 1995 (Gessler & Kotulla, 1995). Looking at the 
design objectives, or requirements for the future device based on that more primitive 
device, shows the value of abstracting the design objectives for future re-use.  
 Besides navigational information, the mobile professional also has an evolving 
need to be able to tap into personal information repositories when on the move (Karypidis 
& Lalis, 2007), without acquiring the overhead of synchronization and file management. 
The Omnistore software is one of the solutions proposed to handle this challenge, as 
mobile professionals continue to create a personal area network with information moving 
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between laptops, desktops, and small form factor mobile devices (Karypidis & Lalis, 
2007).  Research on mobile devices also has included the head-mounted devices (HMD), 
as well as laptop and PDA combinations (Serif & Ghinea, 2008).  The research had 
participants performing real-life tasks in “realistic scenarios,” but not actually as part of 
daily life.  The environment was pre-configured to have Wi-Fi blankets readily available 
as opposed to the current norm of isolated Wi-Fi hotspots.  
      Beyond the actual applications, the mobile device presents challenges for 
readability, which is linked both to physical screen size, and processing power 
deliverable in a the compact format (Dennler et al., 2007).  Larger screen sizes and more 
processing create a greater drain on battery power, particularly conventional lithium-ion 
battery power (Min, Cha, & Ha, 2009).  The development of solar fuel cells have the twin 
advantages of reducing the weight of the device because they are thinner, and improving 
the battery life by the recharging in the mobile environment from a widely available 
energy source (Dennler, et al., 2007).  Oquist and Goldstein (2003) used readability 
formula rapid serial visual presentation (RSVP) to propose an alternate presentation of 
text on the screen to improve readability. Instead of the eye moving across the screen, the 
text appears in discernible chunks anticipating the readers’ consumption rate.  Movement 
of the eye is a factor in balance, which is particularly relevant to mobile devices being 
used while in motion (Barnard, et al., 2005).  
2.1.2. HCI and Gender Differences 
     In the human-computer interaction studies of mobile devices, the focus has been 
specific functionalities such as hand positions (Wobbrock, Myers, & Aung, 2008). 
However, gender differences are frequently noted in the studies, as in preferences of 
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older women for haptic and older men for tactile interface (Kurniawan, 2008).  With the 
current devices so heavily based on manual interaction, the gender differences in 
physicality become significant. 
      Gender differences in hand shape and strength affect the performance of manual 
tasks (Bylund & Burström, 2006; Clerke, Clerke, & Adams, 2005; Crosby & Wehbé, 
1994; Talsania & Kozin, 1998).  Even in a pre-pubertal population, handgrip strength was 
predictable along gender lines (Jürimäe, Hurbo, & Jürimäe, 2009), showing boys and 
girls of similar ages and height still differed significantly in forearm strength.  In addition 
to hand strength and shape, the predilection to carpal tunnel, osteoarthritis and other 
medically handicapping conditions also shows a gender difference (Boz, Ozmenoglu, 
Altunayoglu, Velioglu, & Alioglu, 2004; Xu et al., 1998), where the hand strength 
anthropometric norm of females became a risk factor for developing carpal tunnel 
syndrome (CTS) and osteoarthritis.  
      Beyond gender differences in body parts, there are also differences in how men 
and women interact with mobile devices due to gender norms in processing visual 
information (Kimchi, Amishav, & Sulitzeanu-Kenan, 2009).  As information is presented 
on a small screen in a compact format, optimizing the perception of the mobile user either 
by device physical design, or software design pays off in user satisfaction.  
      The pattern of Internet-connected activities also shows gender differences (Ren & 
Kwan, 2009), with women performing a much higher percentage of maintenance-related 
tasks, over leisure tasks as compared to men.  In addition, the locale of everyday 
activities varies between the genders (Schwanen et al., 2008).  Women traditionally have 
a higher responsibility for household and care giving, and their time available for 
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Internet-connected tasks is fragmented.  Not being tied to a primary location, such as the 
home, provides both freedom and risk.  The maintenance tasks can be performed while in 
transit, or waiting for another activity to commence.  In addition, mobile devices must 
have sufficient security, as in the firewall protection typical of the home network when 
the devices are being used to transmit and manipulate highly private information of 
household finance manipulation.  
      The mounting evidence of gender differences points to a need for flexible 
interfaces that can be tailored to specific physicality of the user (Rode, 2011).  The “one 
size fits all” design that lacks the ability for adjustment leads to HCI with one size that 
fits none well.   
2.3 Mobile Platforms and Security 
      Mobile devices are becoming the technology platform of choice for most people 
to interact with throughout their day (Saha & Mukherjee, 2003).  More than just a phone, 
a mobile device can be an emotional and medical lifeline (Chen & Katz, 2009; Osmani, 
Balasubramaniam, & Botvich, 2008).  With more and more information moving to the 
cloud, the connectivity of the device is as important as the on-board capabilities (Buyya, 
Yeo, Venugopal, Broberg, & Brandic, 2009).  Along with connectivity, the security 
capabilities of the device must protect the information being transmitted to guard an 
individual's privacy (Price, Adam, & Nuseibeh, 2005) and to guard against misuse by 
cyber-criminals (Oberheide & Jahanian, 2010).   
      The nature of the mobile device provides new technology challenges for 
providing security, and new constraints (Mancini et al., 2009).  The physical form factor 
of mobile devices that makes them lightweight and convenient to carry also limits the 
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size of the screen, and the size of the processor that can be put into the device.  The need 
for portability constrains the size of the battery to power the device, and requires the 
battery last as long as possible (Rahmati & Zhong, 2009).  Therefore, the processes on 
mobile devices must be designed to use the lesser computing power of a smaller 
processor and conserve the power used. 
      Along with the constraints, mobile devices typically come with additional 
capabilities such as global positioning systems (GPS), motion detectors (accelerometers), 
and voice input.  This new norm of technology provides new possibilities for interacting 
with the devices (Bayir, Demirbas, & Eagle, 2010).   
2.4 Addressing the Gap in Current Research 
      Though usability design principles have been extensively discusses for the 
workstation platform, these principles focus on the workstation platform (Shneiderman et 
al.,  2016).  The differences in workstation and mobile platforms impacts the 
effectiveness of workstation-based design principles when transferred to the mobile 
platform (Oberheide & Jahanian, 2010), particularly in area of security because security 
is not the primary objective of the user (Gebauer, Kline, & He, 2011), and resources are 
constrained on the mobile platform.  Design principles that reflect the reality of mobile 
devices are needed for effective usable security for mobile devices.   
2.5 Summary of Literature Survey 
 
            Looking across at the literature domains of security design reveals an emphasis on 
complexity for security strength even while the literature on user behavior indicates 
complexity alone fails.  Human error is documented as the consistent weakest link in any 
security system, yet eliminating human error by design is still not the greatest emphasis 
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in security.  The difficulty of studying human behavior related is compounded by 
reluctance of companies and individuals to participate in security studies for fear of 
revealing too much truth about their behavior and creating a security vulnerability.   
The HCI literature reveals that the size of screen and the manipulation of mobile 
interfaces create challenges in design.  Differences in ability to manipulate the device 
based on gender and age are magnified by the smaller margin of error caused by the 
device size.  Finally because mobile devices are not fixed in position, mobile security 
presents additional design challenges to achieve usable security.  
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3. Chapter 3 
Chapter 3 
Research Methodology 
      Typically, application designers for information systems are domain experts in the 
primary functionality of the application, rather than security or usability (Pfleeger & 
Pfleeger, 2009). Design principles that guide the domain expert designer to best practices 
for usability and security enhance the integration of security and usability into 
information systems (Garfinkel, 2005).  In this section, the principles for good security 
design and high usability, as defined in the literature, are examined for overlap and 
conflict.  A combined framework of security-usability principles is presented as a result 
of mapping security and usability design principles together. Next, resources available on 
mobile devices are examined for possible impact on security-usability.  Constrained 
resources specific to the mobile platform are identified, as well as the combined security-
usability design principles that address conservation of those resources.   
      The resulting combined security-usability design principles are evaluated using a 
design science research (DSR) approach.  An artifact consisting of a mobile application 
with a security interface is created by applying the new security-usability design 
principles.  To determine how well the design of the artifact refutes or supports the 
hypotheses, three phases of evaluation were done.  The first set of measures scores the 
complexity of the security interface a predictive modeling tool.  The second set of 
measures uses an experiment where the usage of the artifact is tracked as it conserves 
resources on the mobile platform.  The third set of measures uses a standardized usability 
survey to measure user satisfaction with the artifact.   
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      Design science research solves problems in a more effective and efficient manner 
by creating an artifact to represent the proposed solution (Hevner, March, Park, & Ram, 
2004).  Because of the nature of many design-research problems, an optimal solution may 
not always be possible (Simon, 1996).  A designer instead searches through available 
alternatives until an acceptable alternative, or satisficing is found.  Choosing the design 
science approach is also supported by the security-usability design principles developed 
for the desktop by Garfinkel (2005).  Garfinkel advocated “Good Security Now,” which 
requires designers to search through the available solutions for the best fit at a particular 
point in time. 
3.1 Security and Usability Design Principles Frameworks 
      Usability in design reduces the effort needed to use the system properly from both 
a physical and cognitive perspective (Shneiderman et al., 2016).  When security becomes 
a barrier to getting the job done, users typically choose functionality over security 
(Albrechtsen & Hovden, 2009).  Adding usability to a security design should alleviate the 
need to choose functionality over security (Furnell, 2008).  A combined security-usability 
design framework reduces the effort needed to add security, which means the security 
designer feels less pressure to choose security functionality over system usability 
(Whitten & Tygar, 1999).   
      When designing computer security, it is important to understand what security 
means. Most secure design focuses on confidentiality and integrity at the expense of 
availability  (Aiello & Ruffo, 2012). Availability makes a security asset available to the 
appropriate people at the appropriate times. Another way to say this is to make a security 
asset “usable.”  
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      To articulate the concept of secure design Saltzer and Schroeder (1975) created 
nine principles.  These principles, seen in Table 1, further specify what makes a system 
secure.  At least half of the secure design principles relate directly to the interface with 
the user as shown in the table.  As a result, “good” security design created according to 
these principles already includes recommendations about the interface.  The “protection” 
and “restriction” categories contain principles that describe the functionality that should 
be present to ensure a secure design.  
Table 1.  Security Design Principles by Functionality (Saltzer & Kaashoek, 2009) 
 
Functionality 
 
Principle and Description 
 
 
Interface 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Protection 
 
 
 
 
Restriction 
 
 
Psychological Acceptability    
Whether the user is favorably disposed 
 
Complete Mediation 
Handle all interaction to completion 
 
Least Common Mechanism  
Avoid combining multiple security objectives into the same interface.  
(Similar to modular code.) 
Economy of Mechanism  
 Simple but elegant design  
Failing Secure 
Security error does not create a security breach 
 
Reluctance to Trust 
Access to information, like power, corrupts. 
Never Assume that Your Secrets are Safe 
Even the best security can fail 
 
Principle of Least Privilege 
Give the user only the right access  
Separation of Privilege/duty 
 Checks and balances to avoid too much power for one user 
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 Similar to the security principles created by Saltzer and Schroeder (1975), the 
usability practitioners have the two seminal sets of heuristics or principles for design.  
The Golden Eight from Shneiderman et al. (2016) and ten more from Nielsen (1990) 
form the core of usability design.  These two sets of principles have very similar 
statements on how to design with usability, as shown in Table 2. 
Table 2.  Usability Principles 
 
Usability Principles I Shneiderman’s 
Eight  (Shneiderman, et al., 2016) 
 
 
Usability Principles II   
         Nielsen’s Ten  Usability Heuristics 
(Nielsen & Tahir, 2001) 
 
Internal locus of control 
 
User control and freedom 
  
Shortcuts for experience 
 
Flexibility and efficiency of use 
Easy reversal of actions 
 
Match between system and the real world 
Dialog to Closure 
 
Visibility of system status 
Informative Feedback Error prevention 
 
Help and documentation 
 
Consistency Consistency and standards 
Reduce short-term memory load Recognition rather than recall 
 
Aesthetic and minimalist design 
 
Simple Error Handling Help users recognize, diagnose, and 
recover from errors 
 
 
      These two sets of usability principles have been the cornerstone of usability 
research for over two decades.  In addition to these usability principles, Shneiderman co-
invented the Nassi-Shneiderman chart technique to represent structured programming 
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(Dykstra-Erickson, 2000; Nassi & Shneiderman, 1973).  Similar to the usability research, 
the Nassi-Shneiderman structure charting techniques make the drawing of the flow of a 
structured program more usable than previous techniques.   
Table 3.  Comparing Security Design Principles to Usability Design Principles 
 
 
Security Principles 
(Saltzer & Schroeder, 
1975) 
 
Eight Usability 
Principles   
(Shneiderman, et al., 
2016) 
 
Ten Heuristics for Usability 
Design 
(Nielsen, 1990) 
 
 
Psychological 
Acceptability 
   
 
Internal locus of control  
 
Shortcuts for experience  
 
 
Easy reversal of actions 
 
User control and freedom 
 
Flexibility and efficiency of 
use  
 
Match between system and the 
real world 
   
Complete Mediation 
  
Dialog to Closure  
 
Informative Feedback 
Visibility of system status  
 
Error prevention  
 
Help and documentation 
 
 
Least Common Mechanism 
 
 
Consistency 
 
 
Consistency and standards  
 
Economy of Mechanism  
 
 
Reduce short-term 
memory load 
 
Recognition rather than recall  
 
Aesthetic and minimalist 
design 
 
 
Failing Secure 
 
 
Simple Error Handling 
 
Help users recognize, diagnose, 
and recover from errors 
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    Nielsen’s seminal usability principles are still used as the basis of usability testing 
for the latest technology including mobile devices such as the Amazon Fire tablet 
(Nielsen, 2011).  Resolution of the perceived conflict between security and usability 
requirements in software design has led to the development of frameworks that weigh 
either one or the other concept as a priority (Mairiza & Zowghi, 2010).  The existence of 
this security-usability conflict is an ongoing theme in software design (Ben-Asher, 
Meyer, Moller, & Englert, 2009; Ka-Ping, 2004; Turpe, 2008).  
      Mapping Shneiderman et al.’s (2016) eight usability principles  and Nielsen’s 
(1990) ten heuristics for user interface design to Saltzer and Schroeder’s (1975) security 
design principles  as shown in Table 3, yields an interesting result.  Usability principles 
are not in conflict with secure design principles.  The chart shows each principle in the 
category “interface” for security parallels a usability principle or principles stated for the 
same concept in both Shneiderman’s usability principles and Nielsen’s ten heuristics for 
user interface design. 
             Psychological acceptability can be improved by designing a system according to 
user’s mental map of how the system should work, and their capabilities (Bishop, 2005).  
Security and usability are often labeled non-functional requirement (NFR) and, therefore, 
a less critical part of the software design due to security-usability illiteracy of the 
designer.  A combined design framework reduces the effort needed by a non-expert to 
add security-usability.   
3.1.1 Combining Security and Usability 
        In spite of scarcity of usability in security designs (Cranor & Garfinkel, 2005), the 
mapping shows that usability design principles are essentially a subset of good security 
design principles (Table 4).  Garfinkel (2005) also included usability issues caused by  
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Table 4.  Consolidated Principles of Security and Usability Design 
Security 
Principles  
(Saltzer & 
Schroeder, 1975) 
Usability 
Principles I 
(Shneiderman, 
et al., 2016) 
Usability 
Principles II  
(Nielsen, 1990) 
Usability & Security 
(Garfinkel, 2005) 
 
 
 
Psychological 
Acceptability 
 
Internal locus of 
control  
Shortcuts for 
experience 
Easy reversal of 
actions 
 
User control and 
freedom 
Flexibility and 
efficiency of use  
Match system to  
the real world 
 
 
 
Least Surprise 
 
 
Complete 
Mediation 
 
Dialog to 
Closure  
 
Informative 
Feedback 
 
Visibility of 
system status  
Error prevention  
Help 
documentation 
 
Consistent Meaningful 
Vocabulary 
 
Least Common 
Mechanism 
 
Consistency 
 
Consistency and 
standards  
 
Consistent Controls   
 
 
Economy of 
Mechanism  
 
 
Reduce short-
term memory 
load 
 
Recognition over 
recall  
Aesthetic and 
minimalist design 
 
No External Burden 
 
 Failing Secure 
 
 
Simple Error 
Handling 
 
Help users 
recognize, 
diagnose, and 
recover from 
errors 
 
Provide Standard 
Security Policies 
Reluctance to 
Trust*, Promote 
Privacy* , Never 
Assume  Secrets 
are Safe* 
Least Privilege* 
Separation of 
Privilege/duty* 
 
Not mentioned 
 
Not mentioned 
 
Good Security Now* 
 
 
Note. *security principles not related to usability 
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non-users of the system (Table 4).  In particular the principle “no external burden” 
advocates designs that do not force the user to inconvenience non-users to achieve 
security.  Burdening a non-user who does not use the system directly, and who derives no 
benefit creates a high level of push-back.  
       In articulating these design principles, Garfinkel (2005) made a more usable 
framework by reducing the number from ten (Nielsen, 1990) and eight (Shneiderman et 
al., 2016) to six. To further reduce the analysis effort of the novice designer, Garfinkel 
suggested the use of design patterns to exploit the natural affinity humans have for 
patterns (Schmidt, Fayad, & Johnson, 1996).  Creating usability and security solutions 
from a good model saves time and improves quality (Howarth, Smith-Jackson, & 
Hartson, 2009). 
       Garfinkel (2005) proposed usability-security design patterns for resolving  
suggested the use of design patterns to exploit the natural affinity humans have for 
patterns (Schmidt, Fayad, & Johnson, 1996).  Creating usability and security solutions 
from a good model saves time and improves quality (Howarth, Smith-Jackson, & 
Hartson, 2009) and resolves common issues related to authentication, deletion of files, 
and management of encryption keys.  Howarth, Smith-Jackson, and Hartson (2009) used 
a similar approach to improve the results of novice usability researchers by creating tools 
to resolve the typical data collection and management issues.  Design patterns are also 
being advocated for mobile device interface (Nielsen, 1990) to address the limitations of 
the small screen form factor (Churchill & Hedberg, 2008).  
3.1.2 Transitioning to Mobile  
       Translating security-usability principles to mobile security design patterns goes 
beyond ticking off items on a checklist.  The current security-usability framework does 
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not address the resource constraints upon mobile devices.  Addressing the constraints 
yields principles more relevant to the mobile device platform. Certain principles may 
have more impact than others based on the user effort required to use the system if the 
principle is violated. Quantifying the impact of each principle on usability makes it 
possible to measure system usability.  It also provides designers with a means of 
prioritizing which principles have the most impact.   
       Simply transferring security practices from desktop to mobile has not yielded 
satisfactory usability and user acceptance (Oberheide & Jahanian, 2010).  In spite of this, 
Oberheide and Jahanian (2010) cautioned against throwing out all proven security 
practices.  Instead they advocate an open-minded approach that keeps what works.  
      Ignoring certain security-usability principles in the traditional workstation 
environment of a business or research organization has minor consequences (Botha, 
Furnell, & Clarke, 2008).  In risk management assessment of an information system, the 
vulnerabilities are weighed against the probability of the occurrence, and the loss 
potentially incurred from the occurrence (Azer, El-Kassas, & El-Soudani, 2009). Ignoring 
the resource constraints of the mobile device increases the probability of vulnerability 
because the practical functionality of device is compromised.  
          
 Figure 1.  Resource Constraints on Mobile Devices   
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3.1.3  Design to Alleviate Resource Constraints 
      The three major resource constraints of the mobile device platform are power, 
form factors, and user expertise (Figure 1).  To be mobile, the devices must run from a 
portable and renewable power source, such as a battery (Economides & Grousopoulou, 
2009).  The battery life is an important measure of user satisfaction.  Security design that 
accelerates the drain of battery life reduces the usability of the device.  
      To be mobile the devices must be small enough and light enough to carry easily 
(Haverila, 2011).  The screens must be big enough to use but small enough to fit in 
pocket or purse (Churchill & Hedberg, 2008).  In addition the devices are manipulated for 
information gathering in a variety of settings, often while away from a formal 
workstation (McGibbon, Hosmer, Jeffcoat, & Davis, 2011).   
      In the absence of a formal organization to compensate for individual user 
deficiencies, the applications themselves must have reduced complexity (Churchill & 
Hedberg, 2008).  This paper proposes a security-usability framework that prioritizes 
conserving the resources limited by the physical nature of the device and the expertise of 
the user.  Usable security on the mobile device requires this resource conservation 
perspective over the organizational bias of previous design principles. 
      Revisiting the security-usability framework, seen in Figure 2, reveals five of the 
consolidated principles specifically address conservation of resources, which is clearly 
indicated by the words “Least” and “Economy.”  Principles that relate to organizational 
objectives such as separation of power and reluctance to trust are not as relevant to the 
single-user mobile device, or the non-organization-based mobile device, such as a tablet 
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shared by a family.  As shown in Figure 2, certain principles align to the critical resource 
constraints of mobile devices. 
 
Figure 2.  Design Principles Related to Resources 
     “Economy of Mechanism” relates to all three areas of resource constraint.  The 
result of mapping resource constraints to the design principles is a framework that 
prioritizes conservation of resources, as seen in Table 5.  This framework can be used as 
a starting point to create measures that quantify the energy and effort expended by the 
user, and by the system.  
      The concept of simplification for good security design is also supported by the 
most recent work from security pioneer Jerome Saltzer.  The difficulty of maintaining 
security on a complex group of systems with competing security protocols led to the 
proposal of “Minimize secrets” as an additional security principle (Saltzer & Kaashoek, 
2009; Smith, 2012).  Every secret increases a system’s administrative burden.  In the case 
of self-managed security like a mobile device, the burden falls upon the user.  
Consequently, user effort has already been confirmed as a constrained resource.  
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Table 5.  Proposed Security-Usability Principles for Resource-Constrained Devices 
 
Security Principle 
 
Usability Principle Manifestation  
 
 
Least Surprise 
 
User in control (flexibility and reversibility)  
Shortcuts for experience 
Match between system and real world  
 
Complete Mediation 
 
Visibility of system status 
Dialog to closure 
Informative Consistent Feedback 
Error prevention and Help 
 
Least Common 
Mechanism 
 
Consistency and standards in security policy 
Consistency and standards in placement of information 
(look-and-feel)  
 
Economy of 
Mechanism 
 
Reduce cognitive load 
Recognition rather than recall 
Aesthetic and minimalist design 
 
Principle of Least 
Privilege   
 
Good Security Now 
Limit Functionality/Access  to Reduce Complexity  
 
  
3.2 Design Science Research Methodology 
     To validate the combined security-usability principles for mobile devices 
proposed in the previous section, this study uses design science research (DSR) 
methodology.  Design research (DR) is research into or about design.  DSR is research 
using design as a research method or technique (Hevner et al., 2004).  DSR methodology 
has a series of steps that result in specific outputs (Figure 3).  It can be an iterative 
process, as information from an evaluation influences the design of another element 
(Vaishnavi & Kuechler, 2004). 
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Figure 3.  Steps in DSR Methodology (Hevner et al., 2004) 
 
3.2.1 Awareness of Problem: Design Principles Needed for Mobile Devices  
      As discussed in 3.1.2, Transitioning to Mobile, the design principles for security-
usability have not effectively transferred from workstation to mobile.  The proposed 
security-usability principles address the issues that are at the heart of the incompatibility.  
An artifact that is designed with these principles should demonstrate a higher level of 
security-usability.   
    In applying the design principles to increase the security-usability, the artifact 
should mitigate the normal resistance behavior of users to security (Virginia Tech, 2011).  
Security is not the main goal of the user, and security challenge is seen as an interruption 
of progress toward the desired task (Pfleeger & Caputo, 2012).  For example, a mobile 
user does not unlock a phone because they want to use the unlocking mechanism; they 
unlock the phone to answer it.  The interruption of a task makes the primary task take 
longer to complete and lowers the quality of the result (Lenox, Pilarski, Leathers, & 
2012).  Unusable security can prove so repulsive to a user that the user may make the 
choice to stop using the device to avoid the experience (Theofanos & Pfleeger, 2011).  
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 In the mobile environment where users primarily manage their devices outside the 
confines of an organization, the effect of resistance to security is not mitigated by formal 
policies, or security awareness training (Barkhuus & Polichar, 2011).  Neither is there an 
information technology department to support the user in resolving security interface 
issues.  As discussed in Chapter 2, this puts a greater burden on the user to gain the 
expertise to navigate less usable security interfaces.  
      The most common security interface for Internet sites uses password and user 
identifier authentication, also known as basic authentication (Chiasson, Forget, Stobert, 
Oorschot, & Biddle, 2009).  The manner in which basic authentication is currently 
encountered by mobile device users creates a situation where failure is not only common, 
but inevitable.  The average user has 25 or more user identifier (userid) and password 
combinations to manage (Gao, Ma, Jia, & Ye, 2012).  In most cases the user is expected 
to recall the passwords and userids from memory.  Though users are encouraged to use 
unique passwords for each account (Florencio & Herley, 2007), four to five is the number 
of unrelated, regularly used passwords that users can be expected to successfully 
manipulate (Adams & Sasse, 1999).  
         Because most people find it difficult to remember alphanumeric passwords 
(Florencio & Herley, 2007), they adopt various strategies, usually unsafe, to manage 
them (Everitt, Bragin, Fogarty, & Kohno, 2009).  The gap between passwords to manage, 
and the number that can be remembered dooms the effort to failure if the user relies upon 
the normal capabilities of human memory recall (Horcher & Tejay, 2009).  As a result, 
the accumulation of more accounts normally means the reuse of more passwords, not the 
creation of new ones (Gaw & Felten, 2006).   
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     Using graphical passwords to enhance memorability does not negate the difficulty 
of multiple password recall (Biddle, Chiasson, & Oorschot, 2012).  Furthermore, the user 
may have difficulty in recalling the user identifier (UID), which is relatively public 
(Florencio, Herley, & Coskun, 2007), as well as the password.  The quantity of 
passwords hampers recall regardless of the format.  On the other hand, passwords cannot 
be abandoned until an alternate method of authentication which is usable and secure is 
developed (Stajano, 2011).  As stated previously, Garfinkel’s security-usability design 
principle of “Good Security Now,” advises system designers to design the best security 
possible with the current capabilities instead of waiting for some future discovery to 
solve all the issues (Garfinkel, 2005).  Password safe software to store groups of 
passwords securely behind a single key (Lee & Ewe, 2007) or external password storage 
in a hardware token such as Pico (Stajano, 2011) are options for managing multiple 
passwords.  Using a paper notebook to organize the insecure practice of writing (Roberts, 
2010) can be better from the user perspective than being denied access to accounts.  
3.2.2 Suggested Solution:  Cued-recall Location-based User Entry (CLUE) 
     The artifact used to instantiate the proposed security-usability principles, a 
security navigation interface, provides an alternative to current navigation of basic 
authentication. Rather than the pure recall required by typical UID-password 
authentication, the user is assisted with cued-recall, also known as hints.  The hints are 
delivered  based on the concept of progressive authentication, which seeks to reduce the 
authentication overhead on mobile devices (Riva, Qin, Strauss, & Lymberopoulos, 2012).  
During Riva’s evaluation of a prototype of progressive authentication the users were 
allowed to trade off convenience against stronger protection based on an assignment of 
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risk.  When using content at lower risk, less frequent authentication was required from 
the user. 
In this case the amount of assistance, or cued-recall location-based user entry 
(CLUE), is higher in safe locations and lower in less safe locations.  The design uses the 
capabilities and intrinsic qualities of mobile, such as GPS, to implement progressive 
security based on location.  
Risk assessment of the use of technology shows locations are not equal in security 
risk.  Internet Protocol (IP) addresses of a device are used as a means to identify risk (H. 
Park & Redford, 2007).  By definition a mobile device is one that can change location 
(Barkhuus & Polichar, 2011), so the GPS address is a better indicator of the location and 
the potential risk of the location.  When in the locations that have reduced risk, less risk 
should require less security. Less security, in turn, should require less consumption of 
resources.  Varying the security based on location should appropriately conserve 
constrained resources.   
 Authentication schemes are based on what a user knows, what a user has, and/or 
what a user is (Almuairfi, Veeraraghavan, & Chilamkurti, 2012).  The artifact stores 
password hints and user identifiers instead of the passwords. When the actual password is 
not stored, the user must still bring something they know to authenticate. The user must 
decode the hint into a password.  Using cued recall to perform the memory task of 
password retrieval allows previously inaccessible information in a pure recall situation to 
be retrieved with a retrieval clue (Stobert & Biddle, 2013).  The effort of cued-recall is 
lower than pure recall (Biddle, Chiasson, & Oorschot, 2012).  Therefore the appropriate 
use of cued-recall conserves one of the constrained resources identified for mobile 
devices, user expertise/effort, and applies the proposed security-usability principles.  
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3.2.3 Adjust Security Based on Risk to Conserve Constrained Resources      
The Microsoft security threat model is one of the most simple, and applicable to 
characteristics of software (Steer & Popli, 2008).  As seen in Figure 4, the assessment 
begins with an examination of the objectives of the software.  The objectives of CLUE 
are to conserve the constrained resources on mobile devices.  If the risk varies based on 
location, then the expenditure of resources to compensate for that risk could also vary.  
For example, within the home, a user may not need to have a frequent phone lockout 
because the risk of compromise in that location is lower.   
  
 
Figure 4.  Microsoft Security Threat Model. 
Each location where a mobile device uses the CLUE interface is put in category 
that represents the probable risk at that location. The categories are described in Figure 5, 
and the resulting security behavior from the CLUE interfaces.  
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Figure 5.  Location Security Categories and Behaviors 
          The high risk setting of CLUE behaves like conventional security available on 
mobile devices and desktop workstations.  The user receives no assistance from the 
CLUE interface, other than a shortcut to the URL of the Internet site being visited.  The 
functionality resembles bookmarks functionality present in most browsers, and has the 
same risk.  Locations by default are public and considered high risk.   
       The medium risk setting of the CLUE interface provides a link to the desired Internet 
site, and the user identifier (UID) for that site.  A work location is typically medium risk 
because physical access is frequently controlled.  
           The low risk setting of the CLUE interface provides a link to the desired Internet 
site, the UID, and a password hint.  The hint is not displayed until the user requests it.  
The user’s home location is typically low risk, because there is very limited access to the 
location, and the access is by persons trusted by the user.   
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      As a result of providing variable security for variable risk (Figure 5), the CLUE 
interface conserves the constrained resources of power, form factors, and user effort in a 
mobile security interface.  Use of the CLUE interface in situations where more of these 
resources are conserved demonstrates a higher level of usability if the proposed principles 
are valid.   
3.2.4 Development 
       For the purposes of the study, mobile devices with GPS capability were needed.  
The mobile device can be used in many contexts, and in very personal ways (Barkhuus & 
Polichar, 2011).  The operating systems on the platform are increasingly diverse, as are 
the capabilities of each platform (Tilson, Sorensen, & Lyytinen, 2012).  To create the 
greatest accessibility across mobile devices, web applications that are accessed using a 
mobile browser have become more popular than creating the application in each native 
operating system (Qing & Clark, 2013).  Web applications that run in Internet browsers 
are compatible with all current mobile platform and allow a comparison to desktop. 
The web application used as the artifact was created using the Bootstrap web 
design framework which uses pre-defined Cascading Style Sheet (CSS)  classes more 
easily create responsive screens which adapt to various device sizes (Lerner, 2012).  The 
scripting backend was the Angularjs JavaScript framework which uses the Model-View-
Whatever (MVW) structure for separating the presentation layer from the database layer 
(Ramos, Valente, Terra, & Santos, 2016).  These structures allow web application 
development that can use modular programming similar to traditional programming 
languages (Ramos et al., 2016).   
The backend uses Google’s Firebase platform for authentication (Google, 2017a).  
Firebase provides basic authentication with email as the UID. There are also options to 
39 
 
  
 
use federated identity providers like Facebook, Twitter, and GitHub.  Using Firebase 
authentication ensures a secure and stable authentication protocol with minimal code for 
integration.  The Firebase platform also provides a no-SQL database for data collection in 
the cloud (Google, 2017b).  The data is synchronized in real-time, and remains available 
even when the application is off-line.  A data console allows a developer to interact with 
the data directly, as well as through Application Programming Interface (API).   
        
Figure 6.  Two Views of CLUE Home Screen with Functionality Labeled 
       A screenshot of the CLUE interface home screen is shown in Figure 6 with labels 
describing the functionality on the screen.  Key functionalities of the interface that apply 
the proposed security-usability principles are labeled by the large blue arrows.  The 
functionality may relate to more than one of the design principles.  Only the functionalities 
in the interface directly related to user interaction with authentication are labelled.   
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Table 6.  Application of  Security Principles to CLUE Design (Subset) 
 
CLUE 
element 
 
Principle 
 
 
Usability Equivalent 
 
Discussion 
 
 
 
 
Menu of 
websites 
 
Least Surprise 
 
User in control  
 
User chooses websites  
 
Match system to real world  
 
Menu like restaurant 
 
Complete 
Mediation 
 
Error prevention and Help 
 
Help option on menu 
 
Least 
Common 
Mechanism 
 
Consistency in placement  
 
Upper right corner 
 
 
Economy of 
Mechanism 
 
Reduce cognitive load 
Recognition rather than recall 
 
Select instead of  type 
 
Aesthetic and minimalist design 
 
Hide/display on click 
 
 
 
 
GPS 
mode 
 
Least 
Surprise 
 
Shortcuts for experience  
 
User can change mode  
 
 
Match system and real world 
 
Icons use traffic light 
color (red/yellow/green) 
 
Complete 
Mediation 
 
Visibility of system status  
 
Risk level on screen 
 
Informative Consistent Feedback 
  
Pictures instead of words  
 
Economy of  
mechanism 
 
Aesthetic and minimalist design  
 
Pictures instead of words 
 
Principle of 
Least 
Privilege   
 
Limit Functionality/Access  to 
Reduce Complexity  
 
Auto-set risk level 
 
 
Favorites  
Carousel  
 
 
Economy of  
mechanism 
 
 
Reduce cognitive load 
Aesthetic and minimalist design 
 
Select from screen 
Large icons as default 
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In Table 6 the security-usability principles derived in 3.1.3 are mapped to the 
corresponding functionality in the CLUE interface.  Each user interaction with the CLUE 
interface was designed to conserve the number of keystrokes/clicks, the cognitive load on 
the user, the complexity of the layout on a smaller screen, the number of processes that run, 
and apply the maximum security-usability principles possible.  Simply following a 
checklist  has not produced high quality usable interfaces (Zezschwitz, Dunphy, & Luca, 
2013).  At an IBM research facility, examining software designs and getting predictive 
feedback on user interactions even at the wireframe stage was critical to a successful 
software design (Bellamy, John, & Kogan, 2011).  This technique, which produced the user 
interface design instrument Cogtool, was used to measure the efficiency of CLUE.  
 
Figure 7.  Design Science Research Applied to Proposed Research. 
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3.3 Evaluation 
           The CLUE interface embodies the combined security-usability principles for 
mobile devices described above.  In Figure 7, the steps followed are summarized and 
mapped to DSR. In the evaluation phase, the CLUE interface is assessed using the web 
application created as an artifact to instantiate the mobile security design principles.  The 
artifact was evaluated based on the following hypotheses to prove security usability for 
mobile devices requires conservation instead of complication. 
 H0: CLUE will have no impact on the usability of basic authentication 
 H1: CLUE will increase the user success  navigating basic authentication  
 H2: CLUE will improve the user experience of using basic authentication  
The first two hypotheses looks at whether the user achieved entry into the 
application and did not have to retrieve either the UID or password, or need to reset 
password. Lack of success has typically led to circumventing security or insecure 
practices like writing passwords down (Nelson & Vu, 2010). Avoiding those time-
consuming actions leads to both success and improved experience.  
 H3: CLUE will improve usability by reducing the power consumed  by reducing 
the frequency of issuing the security challenge 
 
  H4: CLUE will improve usability by minimizing manipulation of the device 
during authentication in ways such as keystrokes and screen swipes  
 
Measuring power from a hardware perspective is a complicated procedure and 
typically prohibitively expensive for the software designer with the usual skill set 
(Hudert, Niemann, & Eymann, 2010).  Instead, application developers are encouraged to 
conserve power by reducing displays, calls to networks, and screen refreshes (John, 
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Swart, Bellamy, Blackmon, & Brown, 2013).  The third hypothesis uses this convention 
of avoiding power usage to measure the conservation of power. 
The fourth hypothesis explores the concept that the manipulation of the form 
factors is the root of the lack of usability for many applications on the mobile platform 
(Li, Guy, Yatani, & Truong, 2011; Serrano, Lecolinet, & Guiard, 2013; Shirazi, Henze, 
Dingler, Kunze, & Schmidt, 2013), and even more so for security (Chiang & Chiasson, 
2013).   
 H5:  CLUE will improve usability by conserving user effort  such as memory 
recall, and task identification  
 
 H6:  Non-workstation (mobile) use of basic authentication with design principles 
of CLUE will show less difficulty than workstation use of basic authentication.  
 
The fifth hypothesis focuses on the role of cognitive effort in the actions involved 
in basic authentication.  This effort is less obvious than the physical challenges explored 
in the first hypothesis, but the importance of conserving cognitive effort is recognized as 
needed in authentication (Herzberg & Margulies, 2012; Theofanos & Pfleeger, 2011).  
Finally, the sixth hypothesis looks at the higher level of difficulty experienced by users of 
security interfaces on mobile versus desktop (Oberheide & Jahanian, 2010).  
As mentioned in the literature review, usability is characterized by efficiency, 
effectiveness, and satisfaction (Jokela, Iivari, Matero, & Karukka, 2003).  To validate that 
applying the security-usability design principles for mobile device to security interfaces 
increases usability, three phases of validation were done, each aligned with a 
characteristic of usability.   
       The current preferred norm for basic authentication provides no assistance for 
retrieving the UID or the password (Capek, Hub, Myskova, & Roudny, 2010).  Within 
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the CLUE interface the High-risk location is the option/pathway/mode that equates to that 
norm.  Consequently, measures taken for High-risk mode represents the pre-experimental 
conditions.  The basic authentication, in spite of its weaknesses, is still the ISO standard 
for entity authentication (Basin, Cremers, & Meier, 2012).   
      In Table 7 the various phases of the evaluation that correspond to the ISO 9241-
11 characteristics of usability (Jokela et al., 2003) are summarized and mapped to the 
hypotheses.  In each case the hypotheses are supported or/ refuted by applying the 
principles to the design as a whole, not as individual principles.  Details of each phase are 
Table 7.  Summary of Evaluation Phases and Hypotheses Measured 
 
Phase  
 
Research 
Method 
 
 
Principle(s) tested 
 
Hypotheses 
 
 
1-Efficiency 
 
Simulation 
with known 
instrument 
Cogtool 
 
 
Economy of 
mechanism, 
Complete 
mediation 
 
 
H0 – no impact 
H1 – success in navigation 
H3 – power conserved 
H4 – Form factor conserved 
H5 – User effort conserved 
H6 -  Mobile vs Desktop  
 
 
2-Effectiveness 
 
Experiment 
 
Least Surprise, 
Economy of 
Mechanism,  
Least Privilege, 
Complete 
Mediation, 
Least common 
mechanism 
 
 
H0 – no impact 
H1 – success in navigation  
H2 – user satisfaction 
H3 – power conserved 
H4 – Form factor conserved 
H5 – User effort conserved 
H6 -  Mobile vs Desktop 
 
 
3-Satisfaction 
 
Survey  
 
Least Surprise, 
Economy of 
Mechanism,  
Complete 
Mediation 
 
H0 – no impact 
H1 – success rate  
H2 – user satisfaction 
H5 – User effort conserved 
H6 -  Mobile vs Desktop 
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 in the sections following the table.  Combining cognitive modelling like Phase 1 with a 
user study like Phase 2 gives more evidence and better perspectives (Bhensook & 
Senivongse, 2012). 
 
3.3.1  Use Cases 
      In phase 1 and 2 of evaluation, the following use cases are to generate the data for 
measurement.  Each use case describes a sequence of events related to a user’s interaction 
with the CLUE security interface.  There are four possible use cases in the CLUE 
interface for a user’s interaction with an interface with password-UID authentication 
(Table 8).  Depending on the security mode as set by GPS location, described in 3.2.3, 
the user gets varying amounts of assistance to navigate the user interface.  Detailed 
diagrams of use cases appear in Appendix A.   
Table 8.  Use Cases for Testing Security Set by Location 
  
Use  
Case 
 
 
Got 
UID? 
 
Got 
Password
? 
 
Assistance given 
(applying principles0 
 
Comments 
 
1 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
All modes need no assistance 
 
 
All modes lead to success 
 
2 
 
Yes 
 
No 
 
High- none 
Medium - UID 
Low – UID  & password hint 
 
 
High fails, other modes 
may succeed 
 
3 
 
No 
 
Yes 
 
High- none 
Medium - UID 
Low – UID & password hint 
 
 
High fails, other modes 
may succeed with 
assistance 
 
4 
 
No 
 
No 
 
High- none 
Medium - UID 
Low - UID & password hint 
 
 
High fails, other modes 
have more success 
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3.3.2  Measuring the Constrained Resources 
       Within the evaluation phase, the consumption of constrained resources was 
measured both in the design phase, and during actual user interaction.  Previous research 
in HCI and security interfaces on the mobile platform provides guidance on which 
indicators to measure (Table 9). Cognitive activity as a critical component of usability 
frameworks is also supported by constructs employed by usability professionals to 
evaluate system use (Hertzum & Clemmensen, 2012). 
Table 9.  Actions to Measure for Constrained Resources 
 
Constrained 
Resource 
 
Action to Measure 
 
Reference 
 
Power 
 
Screen display 
30 sec elapsed display   
CPU call by command button 
 
Knight, Pyrzak, & Green, 2007  
Hudert et al., 2010   
Anand et al., 2011  
 
 
Form Factor 
 
# of Keystrokes  (desktop) 
# of Screen Touch/Swipe 
(mobile)  
 
# of Button pushes 
 
Holleis, Scherr, & Broll, 2011  
Bernal, Ardito, Morisio, & Falcarin, 
2010   
Dunphy & Olivier, 2012     
 
User effort 
 
# of pure Mental recalls 
# of cued mental recalls 
 
Holleis et al., 2011  
Holleis et al., 2011  
 
 
These three manifestations of display, CPU, and network consume 45-50% of the 
total system power on the typical smart phone (Knight et al., 2007).  Therefore, to 
measure power consumption from the context of the CLUE interface, three 
manifestations of expending power are recorded as seen in Figure 8. 
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Figure 8.  Measuring Constrained Resources 
        To measure how much manipulation of the form factors is required, the number of 
keystrokes plus the number of screen swipes/touches and the number of physical buttons 
pushes (other than keyboard) is recorded.  Though Li, Liu, Liu, Wang, Li, and Rau 
(2010) proposed nine new operators to describe a user’s physical interaction with mobile 
devices, not all these operators are valid in the context of a security interface.  Since this 
research looks at reducing the number of keystrokes and screen interactions, the different 
motivations for the physical interactions that motivate the delineation described by Li et 
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al. (2010) are not of interest.  This summarization of the physical operators is supported 
by Holleis et al. (2011) in their expansion of KLM to study NFC tags on the mobile 
platform.   
      Both Holleis et al. (2011) and Li et al. (2011) combined a mental effort operator 
with physical operator (s) to describe an operation block.  In the expert user community 
that Holleis et al. (2011) and Li et al. (2011) study this sequencing may be valid.  
However for the novice or less technology literate, the mental effort may vary within that 
sequence of mental and physical actions. This research focuses on the novice user, so the 
mental effort is separated from physical effort.  Studies of literate and non-literate mobile 
phone users in India support this separation of physical form factor effort from mental 
effort (Holleis, Luther, Broll, & Souville, 2013).  The results of rural mobile phone usage 
indicate little variance in the physical effort, but a great variance in the usability of the 
mental effort tasks between the literate and non-literate users.  Cognitive activity as a 
critical component of usability frameworks is also supported by constructs employed by 
usability professionals to evaluate system use (Hertzum & Clemmensen, 2012). 
      User effort to recall is measured by recording the number of times a user is asked 
to recall information with and without a cue, and how many steps are in a process 
sequence executed by a user.  Each process step equates to a recall “unit” of measure.  
Each recall with a cue is equated to one effort unit.  Each recall without a cue is measured 
as two units, because of the higher level of difficulty and cognitive load.  This 
consideration of the user cognitive activity, and weighting of increased difficulty as a 
component of usability, is supported by the usability professionals common research 
constructs analyzed by Hertzum et al (2012).   
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     Previous studies have looked at keystrokes as a measure of the usability of a 
system, such as the total-effort metrics approach (Kim et al., 2010).  As usability 
designers continue to examine the difference between desktop keystrokes and mobile 
device keystrokes, amendment of the Keystroke-Level-Modeling protocols (Card et al. 
1980), particularly in the area of security interfaces,  have been necessary to 
accommodate the reality of mobile (Dunphy & Olivier, 2012; Zezschwitz et al., 2013).  
This research looks for the impact in more than one area of resource consumption.   
3.3.3 Phase 1 – Efficiency with CogTool   
A CogTool score of application complexity is used to measure the efficiency of 
the CLUE security interface,  As discussed in  3.2.4CogTool  was developed by usability 
researchers to model the complexity of an application interface based on wireframes of 
the planned screens, and a mapping of the flow between these screens (John, 2011).  The 
CogTool score is based on a database of human performers using computer interfaces.  A 
lower CogTool score indicates a less complex interface which is more desirable.   
     CogTool can create a usability measure at the design stage, instead at the 
production stage.  This allows fine-tuning of a design without the expense of 
programming (Zezschwitz et al., 2013).  In this study the measures were done at the end 
of development to provide a measure of usability of the final version.   
     Other functionalities available for adding categories, websites, and new locations 
to the various security modes are not part of an authentication sequence and thereby 
excluded from the measures in this study.   
Hypotheses Tested 
     In Phase 1 evaluation of the efficiency of security-usability, the following 
hypotheses are addressed as described in Table 10. 
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Table 10.  Phase 1 Hypotheses Validation 
 
Hypothesis 
 
Measurement 
 
Measuring success 
 
 
H0 - no impact   
 
Overall CogTool score for 
all security tasks  
 
High is the current norm High  
risk score would be less than or 
equal to score for the Medium 
and Low risk meaning the 
principles don’t apply   
   
H1 - impact on 
usability   
Overall CogTool score for 
all security tasks 
High is the current norm. High 
risk score would be greater than 
score for the Medium and Low 
risk meaning  principles apply   
 
H2 - improve the user 
experience  
CogTool score of each 
security task for each 
platform and each security 
mode 
 
Score for Low and Medium risk 
are lower than High risk for 
using for each task 
 
H3 - conserving power CogTool score for power 
subtasks that make up the 
security tasks 
 
Score for Low and Medium risk   
are lower than High risk  
 
H4 - reducing 
manipulation 
CogTool score for form 
factor subtasks that make 
up the security tasks 
 
 
Score for Low and Medium risk   
are lower than High risk 
 
H5 - conserving user 
effort 
CogTool score for user 
effort subtasks that make 
up the security tasks 
 
Score for Low and Medium risk   
are lower than High risk 
 
H6- Mobile vs desktop 
 
Overall CogTool score for 
each security task on each 
platform 
Score for security task on 
mobile is lower than score on 
desktop once principles applied 
for Med and Low modes 
 
 Data Collection for Phase 1 Efficiency  
 To compute a CogTool score the designer creates a wireframe of the interactions 
that to be measured.  The transitions that occur between the various screens are drawn out 
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and described based on how they are accomplished.  For example, typing in a textbox 
transition using a workstation or desktop involves a keyboard and a string of characters 
that are entered. In the illustration below the wireframes of the CLUE artifact are linked 
with arrows that have data attached that describe the actions that take place when 
transitioning between the screens.  In Figure 9 the wireframe for the interface on desktop 
for low risk can be seen.  Wireframes for the other designs are in Appendix B.  
 
Figure 9.  CogTool Wireframe of Desktop Design for Low Risk 
 
 Once the wireframes are linked with transitions, the designer goes into the 
CogTool demonstrate mode to walk through the tasks.  Four security-related tasks were 
analyzed for usability in each design (Table 11).  Three versions of the security interface 
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to a web application were created with varying amounts of user cognitive effort and 
screen interactions.  Because the artifact was a web application, the same interfaces were 
evaluated on the traditional workstation and on mobile devices.  The study examines the 
difference between a security-interfaces constrained on the mobile platform.  Therefore 
when the designer demonstrates the task, it is done on a design that reflects the form 
factor, user effort, and power that is available on a workstation, as well as a design that 
shows the capabilities of a mobile device.   
Table 11.  Security-related Tasks for Basic Authentication 
 
These same four security tasks are used to describe the path taken by a user 
through the security interface.  There are four possible paths through the interface based 
what security information the user possesses.  Depending on the design of the interface, 
the designer demonstrated more or less of the tasks.  For example, as part of the design 
for medium and low risk the UID is provided as part of the assistance offered to the user.  
Therefore in medium or low mode the UID recovery task is never performed.  The 
password recovery task is only available in low mode.  On the other hand Logon Attempt 
and password reset tasks are used in all risk modes.  Use Case 4, where the user does not 
know UID or password is diagrammed in Figure 10.  The diagrams for all four use cases 
appear in Appendix A. 
Task Knows UID  Knows Password 
Logon Attempt Yes Yes 
UID recovery No  Yes 
Password Reset Yes No 
Password Recovery (Cued recall) No No   
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In the diagram (Figure 10) the red arrows represent the current norm, which is 
High risk.  The yellow arrows represent Medium risk, and the green arrows the Low risk 
mode.  Using the diagrams for the four use cases, the security tasks that must be 
performed to achieve successful authentication in each instance are clear.  The CogTool 
score for successful authentication becomes the sum of the security-related tasks that are 
on the path for a particular design  (Zezschwitz et al., 2013). 
 
Figure 10.  Use Case 4 - User Does Not Know UID or Password 
The UID password used to “demonstrate” or walk through a Cogtool simulation 
was chosen to emulate the most typical values used for user accounts.  Before emails 
became common-place, users chose random usernames as an account identifier 
(Poremba, 2014).  Email addresses became a popular option with account suppliers 
because they are already unique and provide a communication channel for both 
marketing and password recovery. 
The majority of  email address ranges between 16-28 characters (Bliss, 2015).  On 
the other hand, email addresses generated from legacy systems such as Unix are typically 
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8 characters plus “@”plus a domain name for the email server (Blezard & Marceau, 
2002).  Users typically prefer a shorter email particularly if typing on a mobile phone. 
Therefore the UID chosen for the simulation is:  abcdefgh@abcd.com. 
The password for the demonstration was chosen to follow rules for a strong 
password which are shown in Table 12. A special character is also a frequent requirement 
for passwords generated by banks and other institutions providing access to sensitive 
information.  Therefore the password chosen for the simulation was:  Abcdefgh2`  
After the simulation of the path through the security interface is complete, CogTool 
computes a score which indicates the difficulty in seconds. 
Table 12.  Rules for a Strong Password (Horcher & Tejay, 2009) 
  Mapping the sub-tasks 
The current version of Cogtool provides a visualization of how the measures of 
user interaction is generated.  In the tool only two visualizations can be compared at a 
time (Figure 11).  The measures on the visualization graph are broken down into eye 
movements, left-hand movements, and cognition.  Looking at the visualization example 
of email input on desktop and mobile, it is clear that the same keystroke on desktop uses 
Rule Derivation from Literature 
 
8 characters or more 
 
Morris and Thompson, 1979 (Morris & Thompson, 
1979)  
   
At least one number and at least 
one uppercase 
Vu et al., 2007  (Vu et al., 2007) 
 
Misspell words 
 
Keith, Shao and Steinbart, 2007 (Keith, Shao, & 
Steinbart, 2007) 
 
Use Passphrase  
 
Pinkas and Sander, 2002 (Pinkas & Sander, 2002) 
 
No seasons, days of the week, 
months, or names 
 
Morris and Thompson, 1979 (Morris & Thompson, 
1979) 
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different resources on each platform and different amounts of that resource.  In particular, 
more of the constrained resources of user effort (aka cognition) and form factor (Eye-
move, Right-hand, Left-hand) are consumed on mobile.  
  
Figure 11.  Cogtool Visualization of Input on Desktop (above) and Mobile (below) 
 
Unfortunately this level of granularity is not in the reports available to the 
designer using the tool.  To make the data for the CogTool score more granular for 
analysis, each security task was divided into subtasks for demonstration.  Each subtask 
corresponds roughly to one of the three constrained resources.  The subtasks typically 
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represent a self-contained sequence that can possibly be avoided by re-design and 
subsequently conserve a resource.  Breaking the predicted resource consumption down by 
the constrained resources allows individual confirmation/refutation of hypotheses related 
to these resources.   
 
Figure 12.  Sample Values from CogTool 
Data Analysis 
       CogTool was used to create a score for each mode of security access, according to 
the use cases described in 3.3.1.  The CogTool scores were also created for the 
constrained resources for each design.  A comparative analysis of the resulting scores is 
how the data is typically analyzed to determine the best alternative.  During the 
introduction of CogTool at the IBM research laboratories software designs were scored 
with CogTool, and the resulting scores and graphs of functionality implementation 
compared.  John et al. (2011) also found the process of visualization required for the 
CogTool analysis provided clarity to the designers.  The CogTool scores were also used 
to identify which tasks are consuming the greatest amount of constrained resources.   
3.3.4 Phase 2 –Effectiveness 
     In this phase the impact of the CLUE interface design on user navigation of basic 
(password-UID) authentication on website was assessed.  The actual usage data collected 
reveals how often the assistance offered by CLUE is invoked as part of daily usage.   
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      Experimental research method was chosen because evaluating a design artifact 
using an experiment empirically demonstrates the qualities of the artifact and provides an 
avenue for generalizing the findings to a larger context (D'Aubeterre, Singh, & Iyer, 
2008).  An experiment frequently compares a previous norm with a changed set of 
conditions.  As described in 3.2.3, the previous norm is the “High-risk” mode which 
provides no additional assistance.  The degree to which data collected for  “Medium-
risk,”  and “Low-risk” deviate from the data collected for “High-risk”  clearly illustrates 
the impact of the applying the security-usability principles.  
     The CLUE interface automatically collects data about which sites were used, the 
security mode used, how long the user spent in the interface, and whether the usage was 
successful.  The data collected about usage is appears the data model shown in Figure 13. 
.     
Figure 13.  Data Model of Phase 2 Data 
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Experimental Design 
        To evaluate the web application created as an artifact to illustrate the security-
usability design principles for mobile devices; this phase study used a quasi-experiment 
with repeated measures and counter-balanced design.  The decision process for design 
type is shown in Figure 14. 
 
Figure 14.  Experiment Design Decision Process (Lazar, Feng, & Hochheiser, 2010) 
 
    This phase used a repeated measures design, in which subjects act as their own 
control as they are exposed to all versions or variations of the changed conditions 
(D’Aubeterre et al., 2008).  In this study, the control was represented by the “High” 
mode.  The repeated measures design provides powerful statistics even with a limited 
subject group.   
      After initial training and the first set of measures, the subjects used the various 
modes based on their location.  The number of tasks possible within the interface is 
minimized as described in Appendix A.  A smaller number of tasks improves the ability 
of the users to identify usability problems (Bruun & Stage, 2012).  The frequency of how 
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often the subjects invoke each mode determined the success rate of the improved modes 
of “Medium,” and “Low” versus the current norm represented by “High.”   
 Subjects 
      The subjects for this study were recruited from an organization of small business 
owners and professionals, a group of technical women, and university students.  These 
subjects were a convenience sample, recruited from organizations to which the principal 
investigator had access.  The technical women, ranging from 22-75, belonged to a 
national group and represent both academic and business leaders with a high level of 
computer literacy.  The business owners and professionals, on the other hand, ranged in 
age from 22-75, split almost 50-50 in gender, and range in technology ability from 
neophyte to skilled computer support.  The university students included both graduates 
and undergraduates ranging in age from 18-28.  The subject population consisted of 15-
20 subjects as is typical for usability studies  (Hwang & Salvendy, 2010), particularly of 
non-medical systems (Schmettow, Vos, & Schraagen, 2013) 
    Participation in the study was voluntary.  An incentive of a gift card was provided 
to every subject who completed the tasks in this phase, Phase 2, as listed in Appendix C, 
plus Phase 3 of the CLUE evaluation.  Incentives such as cash and gift cards are typical 
techniques for recruiting research study participants (T. Park et al., 2011) and have been 
shown to improve the quality of the participants’ interaction (H. Li et al., 2010).   
Procedure  
     There are three stages to the experimental procedure: configuration, initial usage, 
ongoing usage (Appendix D).  The configuration stage was designed to absorb all the 
user effort present only at setup, and remove it from the experiment evaluation.  This 
reflects a batteries-included approach (Dubois, 2007) to technology interaction.  A 
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questionnaire administered by Surveygizmo provided default values for the websites 
configured in the CLUE interface.  The data from Surveygizmo similar to other Internet 
survey tools like Survey Monkey.   
      The survey data was analyzed using frequency tables to see which websites and 
categories are the appropriate values to be presented as the default set.  The questions 
asked during the survey were used to determine the most commonly used Internet sites 
that require password authentication, typical categories that users used to describe the 
sites in terms of security risk, and what security risk level the users felt relevant to 
particular sites.  Research conducted on the security needs of the at-home user versus the 
business user indicates that there is a growing perception that security needs vary by 
application (Hayashi, Riva, Strauss, Brush, & Schechter, 2012).  
     Because Internet website landscape is a rapidly evolving environment, the most 
common sites were updated over the course of the study (Androutsos, 2011).  The 
questionnaire provided a consistent data feed for that information not biased by the 
perspective of an individual blogger, and more current for an Internet user population 
possessing varying levels of technology competency of the CLUE interface.   
The questionnaire used for Surveygizmo appears in Appendix E.             
The initial usage stage introduced the subject to the interface using a tutorial. .  
The subject then signed up for an account so their usage of CLUE could be authenticated.  
The ongoing usage stage tracked usage of the CLUE interface in a natural setting, with a 
daily reminder via text message and email with a suggested task.  This type of data is 
more revealing of day-to-day usage patterns and is a preferred measure of usability, 
particularly on mobile platform (Zezschwitz et al., 2013).  Studies involving mobile 
device interactions with web browsers (Shirazi et al., 2013) similar to the CLUE interface 
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have illustrated the value of field data, particularly when validating and deriving design 
guidelines. 
 
Figure 15.  Data Model of User Setup Done in Configuration. 
   The subjects interact with the CLUE interface for two weeks.  A minimum 
amount of usage was required to receive the incentive.  A data model of the configuration 
and data collection appears in Figure 15.  At the end of two weeks, the subject was 
invited to take the satisfaction survey described in Phase 3 of evaluation. The following 
hypotheses are tested during this phase of the evaluation, as seen in Table 13.   
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Table 13.  Phase 2 Hypotheses Tested 
 
Data Analysis    
      The datasets with the usage data described in Figure 13, plus the demographic and 
configuration data described in Figure 15, were loaded into SPSS and Excel.  The impact 
of applying the security principles was examined by looking at the rate of successful 
usage of the medium and low security modes.  The frequency of how often the low and 
medium security modes are invoked shows how often the resources are conserved.  The 
duration of usage was analyzed to determine the typical amount of time spent navigating 
authentication in both desktop and mobile environments in the original and new designs.   
 
Hypothesis 
 
Variables  
 
Indicators 
 
 
H0 - no impact   
 
Security mode 
 
Success/Fail 
 
 
There is no difference in the rate of 
successful usage  
Resource consumption will be the same 
across all modes 
Medium and low security modes will 
lower to no frequency of usage 
 
H1- will increase 
the success 
Success/Fail  
per usage and  
Security mode 
 
Security modes with medium and low 
security will have a higher success rate 
H3 – conserving 
power 
#screen displays 
#processes  
# elapsed  
Medium and low security modes will 
have lower power consumption recorded 
 
H4 – reducing 
manipulation 
 
#keystrokes 
#swipes/taps 
#Physical button push 
 
Medium and low security modes will 
have less form factors recorded 
 
H5 – reduce user 
effort  
 
# pure recall  
# cued recall 
# multi-step 
sequences 
 
 
Medium and low security modes will 
have less user effort requested  
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3.3.5  Phase 3 – User Satisfaction  
      The third study assesses user satisfaction using the survey method.  Surveys are a 
widely accepted method for gathering this measure within both the security and usability 
communities (Bowen, Reeves, & Schweer, 2013).  One of the most popular, and well-
validated, is the Standardized Usability Scale (SUS), a standardized questionnaire created 
by Brooke (1996) at Digital Equipment Corporation (DEC) as a quick and dirty 
assessment of usability.  Over 500 additional research studies applying SUS have proven 
that the scale is quick, but not so dirty assessment (Sauro, 2011).  This questionnaire is 
considered the best of open-source norm available (Heeringa, West, & Berglund, 2010). 
 
Figure 16.  Standard SUS Reported Likert Scale 
      The SUS uses the following response format shown in Figure 16.  It uses a 5 point 
scale to assess user attitudes (Likert, 1932).  The results of raw SUS scores when 
converted to percentiles yield a letter grade for the application which can be compared to 
other studies.   
The goal of the survey was to evaluate the security interface within the CLUE 
artifact.  Exposing subjects to another security interface to authenticate to collect survey 
data could influence the user perception of the target interface. To avoid this the 
presentation of the survey was designed according to the same usability principles as 
used for the CLUE interface, and matched to the look and feel of CLUE.  The use of 
color with green to indicate positive and red to indicate negative, with white as neutral 
conserves user effort by indicating meaning without requiring the user to read the screen 
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(Figure 17).  This follows the Finstad study that uses images to solicit responses to 
eliminate the need to read the scale (Finstad, 2010). The on-screen targets for responses 
are the recommended size of 9.2 mm to allow easy acquisition from a touchscreen (Parhi, 
Karlson, & Bederson, 2006).  
                           
 Figure 17.  Mobile-optimized Response Format with Color Coding  
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Survey Design 
      The SUS contains 10 items with those five response options, as seen in Table 
14.  The questions were all expressed as positives, instead of flipping between positive 
and negative.  Recent research from Sauro and Lewis (2011) shows that reversing the 
direction of the usability evaluation can result in inconsistent answers if the subject 
responding does not notice the re-calibration in scale.  The reverse also requires the 
researcher recode the responses to keep the scale consistent.  The responses with a 
consistent scale direction (all positive) were demonstrated to have similar accuracy to the 
traditional reversing scale.   
Table 14.  Standardized Usability Survey – Positive response (Sauro & Lewis, 2011)  
 
Item  #  
 
Question 
 
 
1 
 
I think that I would like to use this system frequently 
 
2 
 
I found the system to be simple. 
 
3 
 
I thought the system was easy to use. 
 
4 
 
I think that I could use this app without the support of a technical person. 
 
5 
 
I found the various functions in this system were well integrated. 
 
6 
 
I thought there was a lot of consistency in this system 
 
7 
 
I would imagine that most people would learn to use this system very 
quickly. 
 
8 
 
I found the system very intuitive. 
 
9 
 
I felt very confident using the system. 
 
10 
 
 
I could use the system without having to learn anything new. 
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      As recommended Sauro and Lewis (2011), the specific description of “CLUE” 
was inserted in place of the more generic term, “system.”  The addition of actual system 
name instead of a generic does not affect validity of responses.  Data analysis was done 
using the techniques described below on the standard subgroups within the questionnaire.   
Subjects and Procedure 
      The subjects for the survey are the same participants used for Phase 2 study used 
to evaluate effectiveness.  After two weeks of using the CLUE artifact, the subjects are 
prompted via email, and in the app, to fill out the exit survey.  In each case the link to 
survey is specific to each user to allow correlation of survey data with demographic and 
usage information collected in Phase 2.  The subjects receive an incentive for completing 
the survey.  Subjects who do not complete the survey, do not receive the incentive.  
Hypotheses Tested 
    The survey data will be evaluated to support or refute the hypotheses.  Specific 
questions are mapped to specific hypotheses as shown in Table 15.   
Table 15.  Phase 3 Hypotheses Tested 
 
Hypothesis 
 
 
Measurement 
 
Measuring success 
 
H1- Applying principles 
will increase the success 
of the user in completing 
authentication 
 
Examine questions about 
success  
(#1,#2,#3,#5,#6,#7,#8,#9 on 
SUS) 
 
Favorable  rating received 
as answers on usability 
questions  
 
H4 – reducing 
manipulation 
 
Examine questions about 
manipulating the system   (#2, 
#6, #8) 
 
Positive rating received as 
answers on these questions  
 
 
H5 – conserving user 
effort 
 
Examine questions that 
address user cognitive effort   
(#4, #5, #7, #10) 
 
 
Positive rating received as 
answers on these questions 
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Data Analysis  
      The data analysis for the SUS response will use the accepted techniques for 
generating a grade from the raw score as described by Sauro (2011), and shown in Table 
16.  In addition analyzing the subscales for learnability and usability (Lewis and Sauro 
2009) will provide measures to support or refute the hypotheses related to conserving 
user effort and manipulation of form factors as described in Evaluation above.  The 
techniques provided in Table 16 provide a letter grade that indicates a favorable or 
unfavorable rating.  That is the advantage to SUS – the letter grade is a standard output of 
the data analysis.  
Table 16.  Statistics Analysis for SUS Data (Sauro, 2011) 
 
Stat 
 
Description 
 
Percent Agree summarize the percent of respondents who agreed to the item 
 
Top-Box For 5-point scales the top box is strongly agree 
 
Net Top Box The number of respondents that select the top choice (strongly 
agree) minus the number that select the bottom choice (strongly 
Disagree choice 
 
Z-Score to 
Percentile Rank 
This is a Six-Sigma technique. It converts the raw score into a 
normal score—because rating scale means often follow a 
normal or close to normal distribution.   
 
Coefficient of 
Variation 
Used instead of standard deviation because there is a mix of 
scale points in data. The CV divides the standard deviation by 
the mean.  (1 Higher values indicate higher variability) 
 
3.4 Summary 
This chapter provided an introduction to security usability and design science 
research methodology.  The mapping of security design principles to usability principles 
yielded a combined set of principles.  According to this mapping, usability is a subset of 
68 
 
  
 
good security.  The limited resources on the mobile platform are described.  The 
combined security-usability principles will be focused according to the limitations of the 
mobile platform.  This will produce a set of security-usability principles focused on the 
mobile platform. 
      Once the theoretical background was explained, the research design was 
presented.  The research design reviewed the research methodology, with a high level 
breakdown of the data collection and analysis.  The data collection and analysis section 
provided the necessary research steps required.  The instantiation of the principles was 
done in three phases, with data collected that related to efficiency, effectiveness, and user 
satisfaction.  Each phase evaluated one or more of the hypotheses, with some of the 
hypotheses evaluated in all three phases.  The measures used for determining the support 
or non-support of the hypotheses were identified for each phase.  Materials and resources 
were then identified for completing the study.   
. 
 
  
69 
 
  
 
4. Chapter 4 
Chapter 4 
Results 
      This chapter reports the results from the data collection described in Chapter 3.  
Each phase is reported separately.  The data collected for the phase is summarized in a 
table and displayed in a graph, where appropriate.  After the results for each phase the 
hypotheses that were tested in that phase are refuted or confirmed.   
4.1 Phase 1 – CogTool Analysis of Efficiency 
As described in the methodology, the current state of basic authentication is 
represented by the risk mode labelled “High.”   Six different designs were mapped in 
CogTool, representing High, Medium, and Low risk modes on both a desktop and mobile 
platforms.  Four primary security-related tasks were modelled including logon attempts, 
recovering user identifiers and password, and getting a clue to recall a password.   
 CogTool provides the ability to export the demonstration as a series of steps to a 
comma-limited values (CSV) file, but the difficulty score is not attached.  To get the 
difficulty scores separated by the constrained resource being deployed, the Cogtool 
actions as described in the CSV file were mapped to power, user effort, and form factors.  
Then the individual actions were demonstrated, and a difficulty score computed for each 
separate action by CogTool (Table 17).  Power and user effort both only related to one 
Cogtool action.  Assigning a difficulty for cognitive effort tasks requires consideration of 
the mental task being performed (Shankar, Lin, Brown, & Rice, 2015).  Within the 
Cogtool predictions there needs to be an adjustment for mental effort for more complex 
tasks.  The most complex task, computing a new password, has the most analysis and 
consequently the greatest difficulty.   
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Table 17.  Difficulty Scores in Seconds for Constrained Resources by Action            
 
Action to 
Measure 
 
Constrained 
Resource 
 
CogTool Equivalent 
 
Difficulty 
Desktop  
 
Difficulty 
Mobile 
 
 
Display a screen  
 
Power 
 
Look at  
 
0.5 sec 
 
0.5 sec 
 
Recognition 
 
user effort 
 
Think  
 
1.2 sec 
 
1.2 sec 
 
Decide 
 
 
user effort 
 
Think + Think +Think    
Decision require 
evaluation of option 1, 
evaluation of option 2, 
and choice. 
 
3.6 sec 
 
3.6 sec 
 
Compute input 
 
user effort 
 
Think + Think + Think 
+ Think  
A multiple step mental 
process with a recall of 
requirements like 
password, and 
composing an entry that 
meets the rules. 
 
4.8 sec 
 
4.8 sec 
 
Input character 
 
form factor 
 
Input lower case 
character 
 
0.4 sec 
 
1.8 sec 
 
Input UC 
 
form factor 
 
Input upper case 
character 
 
0.6 sec 
 
3.4 sec 
 
Input Special 
 
form factor 
 
Input special character 
 
0.7 sec 
 
5.1 sec 
 
Input UClc 
 
form factor 
 
Input upper case 
followed by lower case 
 
1.0 sec 
 
5.1 sec 
 
Move and Tap 
 
form factor 
 
Move finger to target 
and Tap touchscreen 
 
NA 
 
0.6 sec 
 
Move Mouse 
 
form factor 
 
Move Mouse  to target 
and Left Click 
 
2.0 sec 
 
NA 
 
Move-no-think 
 
form factor 
 
Move Mouse from 
muscle memory 
 
 
0.9 sec 
 
NA 
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 Actions represent a discrete activity accomplished by the user, similar to the atom 
in chemistry.  Within the actions are smaller components, which appear within the 
CogTool scripts and are automatically added as an action is demonstrated.  Because no 
password recovery was available in the High and Medium risk modes, the values are 
identical to password reset are used because that is the action taken by the user.  
Password reset is identical between the three design modes, because it is outside the 
webapp and is based on interaction with the Google Firebase authentication architecture.  
 
 
Figure 18.  Compare All Security Tasks for All Risk Modes 
 
The Cogtool score was also generated for the overall design of each version of the 
security interface design by combining the scores from all the security tasks (Appendix F 
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- CogTool Mapping Data).  The scores for power consumption from a screen display 
were auto-generated based on the assumptions made by Cogtool.  Wherever Cogtool 
determined a new screen had appeared, a “Look At” action was added to the script which 
is mapped to a use of power. 
Other actions are also auto-generated by Cogtool based on the database of human 
performance modelling data.  For example, every keyboard press automatically creates a 
hand movement action with the correct hand that would be used by typist using the 
QWERTY keyboard.  For a touchscreen interaction, a cognitive action to identify hand 
position is auto-generated based on the need for the user to look at the keyboard and 
identify the spot to touch (John, 2011).   
An overall score for all security task demonstrations appears in Figure 19.  As 
suggested by the greater form factor difficulty for individual actions (Table 17), mobile 
has a higher difficulty in seconds for the current norm, which is labelled “High.”    The 
design changes to conserve constrained resources on mobile in the “Medium” and “Low” 
versions show improvement on scores were generated for “High.”       
 
Figure 19.  Total Difficulty for Each Design for All Resources 
 
1-High 2-Med 3-Low
desktop 103.2 86.9 57.3
mobile 196.2 153.7 99.7
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The Logon Attempt and Password Reset security tasks were projected to be the 
most difficult task according to the Cogtool measure.  Logon Attempt is simply the 
successful input of a UID and password.  The Logon Attempt typically occurs on every 
usage of an application.  Making this task more usable would have frequent and high 
impact on user satisfaction for both desktop and mobile.  But for mobile, the Cogtool 
score for the Logon Attempt task is three times higher for mobile versus the desktop 
platform (Figure 20).  Moving the Logon Attempt task as designed for desktop to mobile, 
which is represented by “Highmobile”, does not conserve the constrained resources and 
results in lower usability.  
   
Figure 20.  Difficulty in Seconds of Logon Attempt Comparison 
 
4.1.1 Understanding the Security Task Components of Constrained Resources 
The Logon Attempt is broken into subtasks (Table 18).  The detail shows the 
subtasks of inputting both UID and password are responsible for most of the difficulty.   
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Table 18.  Detailed Difficulty Scores for Subtasks of Logon 
 
 To check if the constrained resources consumed by each design are conserved, the 
CogTool scores for each action were mapped to the constrained resources.  Each 
CogTool script for each sub-task of each security task was exported individually as a 
Comma Separated Variable (CSV) file. (Figure 21).  All of the scripts were combined to 
  
Figure 21.  Cogtool Script 
 
Task 
 
High 
Desktop 
Med 
Desktop 
Low 
Desktop 
High 
Mobile 
Med 
Mobile 
Low 
Mobile 
 
Logon  25.1 14.9 14.9 68.3 32.9 32.9 
 
Subtasks 
 
Display GPS 2.6 0.6 0.6 1.7 0 0 
 
Recall UID 2.5 0 0 3.2 0 0 
 
Input UID 6.9 0 0 31.2 0 0 
 
Recall pw 2.5 2.5 2.5 3.2 3.1 3.1 
 
Input pw 9.8 9.7 9.7 27.8 27.8 27.8 
 
Display Home 0.8 2 2 1.3 1.8 1.9 
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one file, and then processed with a Visual Basic (VB) program to assign constrained 
resources to actions.  The graphs and data table below show how each constrained 
resource is conserved for the two revised designs, Medium and Low (Figure 22).   
 
 
Figure 22.  Comparison of Constrained Resources  
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form factor power user effort
1-High 2-Med 3-Low 1-High 2-Med 3-Low 1-High 2-Med 3-Low
Desktop 30.5 17.2 14.1 6 4.5 3 54 48 32.4
Mobile 27.6 14.6 11.9 8 6.5 4.5 144 111.6 73.2
Comparison of Constrained Resources 
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As stated previously, the Cogtool score is based on a database of multiple users 
performing a task generated by the ACT-R Engine (Teo, John, & Blackmon, 2012).  
The dependent variable for the analysis is the Cogtool score in seconds for each 
individual security task.  The Cogtool score is a baseline, not a mean.  The following 
equation describes the hypotheses: 
H0 – Baseline Cogtool High <= Baseline Cogtool Medium   or   Baseline Cogtool Low  
H1 – Baseline Cogtool High   >      Baseline Cogtool Medium   and Baseline Cogtool Low   
 When comparing Cogtool scores of a user interface design the previous studies 
use a reduction in interface completion time as the standard for indicating the measure of 
an improved design (John, 2011).  To compare the designs the percent improvement from 
the control value of “High” as well as projected improvement time was calculated (Table 
19).  Statistical significance is not as pressing as practical significance for software 
design (Khansa & Liginlal, 2009).  A statistically significant difference does not drive the 
typical user to modify behavior, particularly security behavior (Gebauer et al., 2011).   
Table 19.  Percent Improvement of Overall Cogtool Design 
Environment 
Current 
Design (High) 
in seconds 
 
Revised 
Design in 
Seconds 
 
Percent 
Improvement 
 
 
Perceived 
Improvement 
in seconds 
(conserved 
resources)  
 
Risk 
level 
 
 
Desktop 103.2 86.9 15.79% 16.3 medium 
 
Desktop 103.2 57.3 44.48% 45.9 low 
          
 
Mobile 196.2 153.7 21.66% 42.5 medium 
 
Mobile 
 
196.2 
 
99.7 
 
49.18% 
 
96.5 
 
low 
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The user is motivated to change by a perceived less interruption time by the security 
interface to the primary task.  The measures shown relate the following hypotheses: 
 H0: CLUE will have no impact on the usability of basic authentication 
 H1: CLUE will increase the user success navigating basic authentication  
 H2: CLUE will improve the user experience of using basic authentication  
 
 
Because the measures on both desktop and mobile show improvement from the 
current norm (High) for both revised designs the null hypothesis is refuted.  Consequently 
H2 User Experience is proven because in Cogtool scores a design which takes less time 
to use is an improvement.   
 The three other hypotheses evaluated in Phase 1 of the study that explore the 
individual constrained resources are as follows: 
 H3: CLUE will improve usability by reducing the power consumed  by reducing 
the frequency of issuing the security challenge 
 
  H4: CLUE will improve usability by minimizing manipulation of the device 
during authentication in ways such as keystrokes and screen swipes  
 
 H5: CLUE will improve usability by conserving user effort  such as memory 
recall, and task identification  
 
As shown in Table 20, the Cogtool scores of the individual sub-tasks that 
consume the constrained resources of form factor, power, and user effort are compared to 
the current norm on both desktop and mobile.  All three constrained resources are 
conserved in both the Medium and Low designs    The Low risk design, as expected, 
conserves a higher amount of the those resources.  
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Table 20.  Improvement for Constrained Resources in Design 
 
Environment 
 
Resource 
 
 
Control 
(High) in 
seconds 
 
Design 
Change in 
seconds 
 
% 
Improved 
Medium 
 
Perceived 
in seconds 
 
 
Medium  
Desktop form factor 30.5 17.2 43.61% 13.30 
 
Mobile form factor 27.6 14.6 47.10% 13.00 
 
Desktop power 6 4.5 25.00% 1.50 
 
Mobile power 8 6.5 18.75% 1.50 
 
Desktop user effort 54 48 11.11% 6.00 
 
Mobile user effort 144 111.6 22.50% 32.40 
 
Low  
 
Desktop form factor 30.5 14.1 53.77% 16.40 
 
Mobile form factor 27.6 11.9 56.88% 15.70 
 
Desktop power 6 3 50.00% 3.00 
 
Mobile power 8 4.5 43.75% 3.50 
 
Desktop user effort 54 32.4 40.00% 21.60 
 
Mobile user effort 144 73.2 49.17% 70.80 
      
 
4.1.2 Phase 1 – Summary and Commentary of Results 
 Applying the design changes to traditional desktop did not result in the same 
magnitude of improvement as seen in mobile.  This is understandable, because the design 
principles target mobile constraints.  The security task for password reset did not have 
any design changes for any risk level on either mobile or desktop, so it would not show 
an improvement.  The password reset is outside of the webapp created for DSR artifact.  
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Password recovery, only available in low risk mode, was available within the webapp and 
showed improvement.   
Table 21.  Phase 1 Summary of Results 
 
Hypothesis 
 
Measurement 
 
Measuring success 
 
 
Supported 
 
H0 –no 
impact   
 
Overall CogTool score 
for all security tasks  
 
High risk Cogtool score is 
lower than CogTool score for 
the Medium and Low Risk 
(Table 19) 
 
 
No 
H1 – impact 
on usability   
Overall CogTool score 
for all security tasks 
High risk Cogtool score is 
higher than CogTool score for 
the Medium and Low Risk 
(Table 19) 
 
Yes 
H2 -  
improve the 
user 
experience  
CogTool score of each 
security task for each 
platform and each 
security mode 
CogTool score for Low and 
Medium risk are lower than 
High risk for using for overall 
design (Table 19) 
 
Yes 
H3 – 
conserving 
power 
CogTool score for 
power subtasks that 
make up the security 
tasks 
CogTool score for power 
subtasks are lower in revised 
design   (Table 20) 
 
Yes 
H4 – 
reducing 
manipulation 
CogTool score for form 
factor subtasks that 
make up the security 
tasks 
CogTool score for form factor  
subtasks are lower in revised 
design   (Table 20) 
 
Yes 
H5 – 
conserving 
user effort 
CogTool score for user 
effort subtasks that 
make up the security 
tasks 
CogTool score for user effort 
subtasks are lower in revised 
design   (Table 20) 
 
Yes 
H6- Mobile 
vs. desktop 
Overall CogTool score 
for each security task 
CogTool score for security 
tasks on mobile vs. Cogtool 
score on desktop  (Figure 18) 
 
No 
 
Even though the design changes result in a lower Cogtool score for Mobile in the 
medium and low risk modes, the scores are still not as low as in the Desktop platform.  
This indicates more constrained resources need to be conserved than this instantiation on 
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the CLUE artifact to achieve parity with security usability on Desktop.  Therefore H6 is 
refuted.  
4.2 Phase 2 Usage Data 
As described in 3.3.4, an artifact was created according to DSR methodology to 
evaluate the design principles proposed.  The structure of the web application (webapp) 
that collects the data is described in Appendix G – Data Definitions of Firebase Usage 
Data.  In the first use of the webapp the subjects set the risk level of various locations based 
on GPS.  When the user logs into the webapp, the location determines the security level of 
the webapp.  Subjects received more assistance navigating security in locations that had 
lower risk.  The data was collected over a period of six months, and includes approximately 
1700 uses of the webapp to navigate security interfaces.  The next sections first discuss the 
demographic data about the subjects who participated in the study.  Next the data from the 
use of the webapp is analyzed to provide support for the hypotheses proposed in 3.3.2. 
4.2.1 Demographic Data 
 
A convenience sample of forty-four individuals were successfully recruited to 
participate in the study.  The participants were university students, small business 
owners, and technical women belonging to Anita Borg Institute group called Systers.  
The participants were grouped into five equal age ranges between greater than 18 and 
less than or equal to 67.  Figure 23 presents the five age groups along with number of 
participants in each group, and separated by gender.   
Within the youngest group male participants are the majority.  But in the older 
groups females predominate.  Females are also roughly 60% of the sample.  Since one 
of the recruitment groups was made up of technical women of all ages, the 
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predominance of women is expected.  Though 118 potential participants were filled out 
the pre-study questionnaire to indicate interest in study, only 44 committed to 
participate.  Even in the initial pre-study phase the interested female participants 
outnumbered potential male participants two to one (Appendix H Figure H 1.  Gender 
Distribution of Potential Subjects).  
 
Figure 23.  Participants by Gender and Age 
 
 The pre-study questionnaire also had potential subject report their educational 
level (Figure 24) and technology expertise (Figure 26).  All participants reported having 
completed High School/GED, and almost half of the participants reported having at least 
a Master’s degree. The highest educational level reported were eight Ph.D. degrees.   
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Figure 24.  Educational Distribution of Subjects 
 
The subjects’ assessment of their own technology expertise showed confidence in 
their skills.  No one felt their ability was any less than fair.  The mean value for 
technology expertise was 3.66, with a standard deviation of .888.  The subjects with the 
highest levels of education assessed themselves as also having the highest levels of 
technology expertise.   
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 25.  Mean and Standard Deviation of Technology Expertise 
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Figure 26.  Technology Expertise vs. Education 
 
 Subjects were expected to have experience with smartphones.  In the pre-study 
survey the subject reported themselves as using a mobile device daily or multiple times 
daily.  This is in line with the reasoning that lead to the research questions.  The 
smartphone phone and/or mobile device becoming the preferred delivery point for 
content.   
Frequency of Mobile Device Use 
gender Mean N Std. Deviation 
Female 4.77 26 .652 
Male 4.94 17 .243 
Prefer not to answer 5.00 1 . 
Total 4.84 44 .526 
 
Figure 27.  Frequency of Mobile Device Use Mean and Standard Deviation 
fair good very good excellent
2 3 4 5
College 3 9 12
Doctoral 1 1 6
Masters 1 5 4 2
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
Technology Expertise vs Education for Subjects
84 
 
  
 
 
 
 
Figure 28.  Frequency of Mobile Device Use 
 
 In summary, the subjects were two-thirds female, well-educated, technologically 
adept and daily users of mobile devices. Gender, age, and educational level were not 
analyzed as part of the hypotheses of the study.  Use of a smartphone and technology 
expertise were required for successful completion.   
4.2.2 Successful Usage of the Webapp 
 
As stated in the methodology, the usage of the webapp CLUE determined the 
effectiveness of conserving constrained resources in the mobile security interface.  The 
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first measure taken was successful navigation of the security interface.  As described in 
Appendix C – Task List for Study Participants, each subject performed a series of tasks.  
In these tasks the subject succeeded or failed in navigation of various security interfaces.  
The users chose which security mode they preferred to use, and how often they want to 
use the webapp.  As discussed in 3.3.1, the successful navigation was marked by the 
retrieval of clue set by user.  Low mode indicated password and userid retrieval success.  
Medium indicated userid retrieval.  High, the current norm or the control, indicated 
success when the user needed no help, and failure when userid or password help was 
requested. 
 
Figure 29.  Sessions for Each Design Type with Success Rate 
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 This measure shows the trend of the user preferring the low security mode which 
has the greatest conservation of constrained resources.  It also shows unpopularity of the 
medium mode.  This unpopularity was predicted by the Cogtool score for the medium 
design on the mobile platform and desktop.  In Figure 30 the average duration of a 
session is compared to the number of total sessions and the total usage.  Users who had 
the greatest difficulty in the first sessions stopped using the app.  Anyone with more than 
seven sessions is using the app beyond the minimum listed in the task list.  This also 
indicates success.  Forty-five out of 54 subjects used the app beyond the training, or 83 
percent.   
 
Figure 30.  Number of session vs Average duration of a session 
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 Both of these measures indicate a higher level of success when using the webapp 
CLUE.  The zeroth hypothesis is disproven, and the H1 is proven.                                                                                                                                                                                                                        
4.2.3 Usage Conserving Constrained Resources  
 
In Phase 1 – CogTool Analysis of Efficiency the seconds consumed by using 
power actions involving screen displays and processing was calculated using human 
performance modelling.  The Cogtool measure of efficiency has been validated by 
previous studies  (Abdulin 2011; Ocak and Cagiltay 2016) as being accurate for these 
actions on mobile. Conservation means the resources are not expended.  Every action that 
uses a revised design mode conserves the difference between the constrained resources 
used by the original design and the revised design.  The data about the resources 
consumed and conserved appears in Appendix I – Data from usage of Webapp CLUE. 
Every action taken in the webapp that corresponds to one of the security tasks in 
Table 11 was logged.  To calculate the impact of the conservation of constrained 
resources, each incidence of the security task was mapped to the measure of resource in 
seconds consumed.  The measures of resource consumed and conserved appear in 
Appendix I – Data from usage of Webapp CLUE.  Based on the usage data presented in 
4.2.2, subjects preferred the webapp versions that conserved the constrained resources.  
The detailed usage describing which security tasks were performed by the users also 
shows the users prefer the “low” version of the design.  The average amount of 
constrained resource conserved per security task is shown in Figure 31.  Power is the 
resource that is conserved the least.  User effort, or cognitive load has the largest amount 
of resource conserved.   
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Figure 31.  Average Constrained Resources Conserved per Task 
 
4.2.4 Phase 2 – Summary of Results 
 
 Each category of resource is conserved for both low and medium modes.  
Hypothesis 3, which states the artifact will conserve power is supported.  Hypothesis 4, 
which states the form factor manipulation is supported.  Hypothesis 5, which states user 
effort will be conserved, is also supported.   
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Table 22.  Phase 2 usage Hypotheses Proven 
 
4.3  Phase 3 SUS Results for User Satisfaction 
As stated in the methodology, participants of the study are asked to take a System 
Usability Scale (SUS) Survey to assess the webapp.  In Phase 2 each subject experienced 
the security interface in some of the modes that conserved constrained resources on the 
mobile platform.  These same modes were analyzed for efficiency in Phase 1 using human 
performance modelling. 
The subjects accessed the mobile-optimized version of the SUS survey (Figure 
17) in a webapp which stored the data in a no-SQL database from Google called Firebase.  
 
Hypothesis 
 
Variables  
 
Indicators 
 
 
Supported 
 
H0 - no impact   
 
Security mode 
Success/Fail 
 
There is no difference in the 
amount of successful usage 
(Figure 29) 
  
 
No 
 
H1- will increase the 
success 
 
Success/Fail  
per usage and  
Security mode 
 
Security modes with medium 
and low security will have a 
higher success rate (Figure 
29) 
 
Yes 
 
H3 – conserving 
power 
 
#screen displays 
#processes  
# elapsed  
 
Medium and low security 
modes consume less  power 
(Figure 31) 
 
Yes 
 
H4 – reducing 
manipulation 
 
#keystrokes 
#swipes/taps 
#Physical button 
push 
 
Medium and low security 
modes consume less  form 
fate  (Figure 31) 
 
Yes 
 
H5 – reduce user 
effort  
 
# pure recall  
# cued recall 
# multi-step 
sequences 
 
 
Medium and low security 
modes consume less  user 
effort  (Figure 31) 
 
Yes 
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The Firebase data was extracted and converted to Comma Separated Values (CSV) 
format.  The CSV file was reformatted to present the information needed for SUS 
analysis.  
The reliability and validity of SUS has been documented by 20 years of SUS 
Scores.  Reliability refers to the consistent response to the items.  SUS detects differences 
in smaller sample sizes (as few as two users) and generates reliable results.  Validity 
refers to whether an instrument measures the target, which for SUS is perceived usability.  
SUS has been shown to effectively distinguish between unusable and usable systems and 
correlates highly with other questionnaire-based measurements of usability.  These 
characteristics combine to make SUS an improvement to commercial alternatives and 
home-grown questionnaires (Sauro, 2011).   
    
Figure 32.  Confidence Interval for SUS Analysis 
 
4.3.1 Confidence Interval of SUS Data 
The statistical analysis of the SUS data indicates a confidence interval of 90%.  
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The sample size required in SUS study for a margin of 10.0 is 20 subjects, as shown in 
Figure 33.  The sample size for the SUS data in this research was 22 subjects, which 
means the study exceeded the minimum required to achieve this accuracy. 
 
Figure 33.  Sample Size Calculation for +/- 10.0 Margin of Error SUS Accuracy 
As described in Phase 3 – User Satisfaction, the SUS scale analysis converts the 
raw score to a letter grade and a percentile.  The letter grade quickly communicates the 
usability of the software to the layperson in easily understandable terms.  An adjective is 
also assigned to the usability ranging from Poor to Excellent to also communicate the 
usability in familiar words (Bangor, Kortum, & Miller, 2009).  The type of task can affect 
the scoring.  A single simple task will score lower than a multi-task sequence (Kortum & 
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Acemyan, 2013).  When the percentile ranking of CLUE is compared to the various 
categories the letter grade changes as seen in Figure 34.  The SUS analysis tool used to 
generate the grade provides both the Bangor value (Bangor et al., 2009) and Lewis and 
Sauro value ( Lewis & Sauro, 2009).  Bangor sets the scale for the letter grade higher, but 
both scores resolve to the same adjective, “Acceptable.” 
 
Figure 34.  Summary of SUS Score compared to other software 
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The CLUE software has its highest letter grade when compared to cell phones and 
business software as also shown in Figure 34.  The favorable comparison of CLUE to 
other cellphones indicates the mobile design principles improve usability perceived. All 
other calculations converting raw SUS scores to percentile also received an acceptable 
rating.  
Two subscales of the SUS are used to measure learnability and usability (Sauro & 
Lewis, 2009).  Questions #4 and #10 measure learnability and the other questions measure 
usability as successful use of the system.  For this study a subscale was added to measure 
user effort.  These questions addressed user perception of the system’s demand on 
cognitive effort.  A subscale was also added to address form factor.  These questions 
addressed the user perception of interaction usability.  The results of SUS data analysis 
appear in Table 23.  The two new subscales were calculated by summing the values of the 
relevant questions, and then converting the sum to a percentile.   
Table 23.  SUS Results for Overall and Subscales 
 
SUS scale name 
 
Questions assessed 
 
Description 
 
Percentile 
 
 
SUS overall 1-10 Entire questionnaire 77.8 
Usability 1,2,3,5,6,7,8,9 
 
Standard subscale 
(Sauro & Lewis, 2009)) 77.7 
Learnability 4, 10 
 
Standard subscale 
(Sauro & Lewis, 2009) 78.4  
Cognitive Load 4,5,7,10 
 
Questions on cognitive 
effort based on 
conserved resources 78.8 
Form Factor 
 
2,4,6 
 
 
Questions on form 
factor based on 
conserved resource 
78.1 
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  The usability as reported by SUS score did not reach the level of the 80th 
percentile, which is the score at which a subject would recommend the webapp to a friend 
(Sauro, 2011).  SUS scores are frequently used to benchmark successive iterations of a 
design, as is appropriate for DSR.   
4.3.2 Phase 3 – Summary of Results 
Based on the data reported above, and the analysis of the hypotheses planned to 
be evaluated in Phase 3 had the results listed in Table 24. 
Table 24.  Hypotheses Results for Phase 3 
 
Hypothesis 
 
 
Measurement 
 
Measuring success 
 
Supported 
 
H1- increase the 
success  
 
Examine questions 
about success  
(#1,#2,#3,#5,#6,#7,#8, 
#9 on SUS) 
 
 
Favorable  rating received 
as answers on usability 
questions 
(Table 23)  
 
Yes 
H2 -  improve the 
user experience 
Examine all questions 
on SUS overall 
Acceptable rating for SUS 
overall 
(Table 23) 
Yes 
 
H4 – reducing 
manipulation 
 
Examine questions 
about manipulating the 
system  (#2, #6, #8) 
 
Positive rating received as 
answers on these questions 
(Table 23) 
 
Yes 
 
H5 – conserving 
user effort 
 
Examine questions 
that address user 
cognitive effort  (#4, 
#5, #7, #10) 
 
 
Positive rating received as 
answers on these questions 
(Table 23) 
 
Yes 
4.4 Summary 
The results of all three phases of the evaluation were reported.  Each phase tested 
a portion of the hypotheses.  The hypotheses tested in each phase and the results were 
summarized in a table at the end of each phase as shown in Table 10, Table 13, and Table 
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15.  As mentioned in 3.3.3, the Cogtool score shows the new security usability principles 
improve the security interface on mobile, but not enough to be better than the desktop 
interface.  As a result, hypothesis 6 is refuted for this artifact.  A summary of all 
hypotheses and results appears in Table 25. 
Table 25.  Summary of All Hypotheses Results by Phase 
 
Hypothesis 
  
Phase 1 
Supported 
 
Phase 2 
Supported 
 
 
Phase 3 
Supported 
 
H0 - no impact  
 
No 
 
No 
 
 
Not Evaluated 
 
H1- increase the success Yes Yes Yes 
 
H2 -  improve the user 
experience  
 
Yes 
 
Not Evaluated 
 
Yes 
 
H3 - conserving power 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Not Evaluated 
 
H4 - reducing manipulation 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
H5 - conserving user effort 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
H6- Mobile vs desktop 
 
 
No 
 
Not Evaluated 
 
Not evaluated 
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5.  Chapter 5  
Chapter 5 
Conclusion 
 
The following section is the final section containing a discussion of the findings 
and the importance.  The research questions are re-visited in light of the results.   
5.1 Conclusions 
 
The first research question is:  How does the overlap or conflict between security and 
usability impact the design of effective usable security on mobile devices? 
By comparing the principles for usability and secure design in 3.1.1 it was shown 
that usability is a subset of good security. Applying usability principles to security design 
did not weaken the security.  Any security that ignores usability principles is also 
ignoring principles for good security design.  Working from a checklist, however, is an 
inaccurate means of applying design principles.  Using a human performance modelling 
tool like Cogtool provides a communicable measure (seconds elapsed) of the usability of 
the design.   
 The Cogtool graphs provided the evidence of the high cognitive load of the 
touchscreen keyboard.  Though the ineffectiveness of wholesale transport of workstation 
security design to the mobile platform has been called into question by previous research 
(Oberheide & Jahanian, 2010), the security model of basic authentication retains a 
significant foothold on mobile (Chiang & Chiasson, 2013).  The lack of usability of basic 
authentication has generated considerable research on alternatives such as pass-faces 
(Dunphy, Nicholson, & Olivier, 2008), graphical passwords (Biddle et al., 2012; Bulling, 
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Alt, & Schmidt, 2012; Chiang & Chiasson, 2013; Gao et al., 2012; Stobert & Biddle, 
2013), pass-chords (Azenkot, Rector, Ladner, & Wobbrock, 2012; Leftheriotis, 2013), 
and gestures (Serrano et al., 2013; Singha, Misra, & Laskar, 2016),  but basic 
authentication is still the most common security model.  
 The results show interaction with basic authentication on a mobile platform 
differs from the workstation resulting in decreased usability. There is hidden cognitive 
load in eyes-on input that increases the difficulty of the security interface. The universal 
availability of a keyboard-like input and the widespread understanding of the concept of 
basic authentication make the low implementation cost almost irresistible to the less 
innovative security designer. In the absence of a measure-predicted usability like this 
study, the impact of poor choices on input can be disregarded.  Similar to the “Don’t Text 
and Drive” campaign, eyes-on security like keyboard-based character authentication with 
taking over 3 seconds should be blacklisted on mobile as the primary interface.   
The usability lessons have been so poorly learned that the paradigm of using a 
touchscreen  for keyboard has spread to even smaller screens with a similar lack of 
success (Withana, Peiris, Samarasekara, & Nanayakkara, 2015).  Password meters have 
been successful in leading users towards stronger passwords (Carne, Carnavalet, & 
Mannan, 2015).  Security usability meters that calculate the difficulty of input on various 
platforms that could guide security designers toward understanding the cost of their 
security choices.  For a mobile platform the length of time the user must be “eyes-on” 
could a trigger a usability warning.  
Common practices supplant best practices when ease of adoption is too high and 
the detrimental effects are not clearly understood.  At one time changing passwords every 
98 
 
  
 
60 days was best practice for security – now research has clearly shown this not to be the 
case.  Similarly strong passwords and the current mobile device keyboard used in motion 
are usability-incompatible.  Even with frequent usage, the sequence of characters inherent 
in a strong password cannot be input accurately with the mobile device in motion.   
5.2 Implications 
 
When creating design principles it is key to know what needs to be changed.  In 
3.1.3 conserving the resources of power, form factor, and user effort were identified as 
key to achieving usability of mobile security.   
The second research question is:  Will a set of design principles structured to 
conserve constrained resource attain security usability? 
The Cogtool score in Phase 1 showed that the design that conserved the 
constrained resources would have higher usability (less seconds to navigate).  The SUS 
score in Phase 3 showed user satisfaction was acceptable but not exceptional.  The key to 
the lower user satisfaction is in the Phase 2 usage data.  When doing keyboard-intensive 
tasks to add input to be retrieved during the execution on security tasks, the users shifted 
back to a desktop version of the interface.   
Though the design does conserve all three constrained resources, the cognitive 
load is not sufficiently reduced to make the current design attractive to use outside the 
boundaries of the study.  The cognitive load comes not only from recall, but from the 
manipulation of the touchscreen interface.  Unlike a keyboard used with a workstation, 
the manipulation of a touchscreen does not benefit from muscle memory to speed the 
manipulation of the form factor and relieve the cognitive load of retrieving the password 
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(Lu, Yu, Yi, Shi, & Zhao, 2017).  The cognitive interaction required by using the eyes to 
guide the user’s fingers across the keyboard takes the same amount of time for the novice 
user and the expert user.  Reducing and/or touchscreen keyboard interaction conserves 
both user cognitive effort and form factor manipulation effort.   
The lack of popularity of the medium mode was obvious in the usage data (Figure 
29).  Comments on post-study survey indicated the users felt the cognitive load of 
deciding which security mode to use was high.  They wanted a location to be safe, and 
their interactions with security supported by CLUE, or not safe, which is the current 
norm.   
Even with the resource conservation, the Cogtool model of the best design 
interface on mobile still had a higher time score than the worse design interface on 
desktop.  This demonstrated by the refutation of H6.  Additional design changes to 
conserve more constrained resources are needed to make the usability of mobile basic 
authentication equal or better than the desktop equivalent. 
5.3 Discussion 
 
Creating a new type of security interface runs into obstacles in several areas.  
Security research has a history of poor participation (Kotulic & Clark, 2004).  Companies 
who have had security breaches don’t want to reveal the details because those details can 
reveal additional vulnerabilities.  When designing security research studies the 
investigator must carefully structure the study to protect not only the typical Personally 
Identifiable Information (PII) but also security-related information.  Strict interpretation 
of Institutional Review Board (IRB) policies written to protect human subjects from harm 
can also hamper security research (Garfinkel, 2008).  In spite of this, security research 
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related to psychology, sociology (Siponen, 2005), human interaction and human error 
(Sasse, Brostoff, & Weirich, 2001) are critical to solving security issues. 
Participation in a security study for individuals is also seen as a risk.  In this study 
approximately 118 subjects were willing to fill out a survey about security attitudes and 
usage, only 44 proceeded to the actual usage of the artifact.  The initial recruitment 
reached out to 8000 possible subjects.  Though no actual passwords were requested in the 
study, the potential participants were cautious about revealing their security behaviors.  
The subjects were a convenience sample, but recruited from groups where the 
investigator had a trusted relationship.  Without some trust in the investigator, 
participation in security research is seen as a risk.  While researchers understand the 
oversight provided by IRB approval (Appendix K – IRB Memo), other desirable research 
subjects need some sort of certification or seal of approval that identifies research that 
will properly protect information about their security behaviors that makes them 
vulnerable to social engineering.   
New security paradigms are also seen as dangerous because the potential subjects 
typically do not understand “the new way” of handling security.  In many cases the 
subjects do not understand all the risks of  the “old way” either, but repeated usages has 
overcome their reluctance  When it comes to security, erring on the side of the known or 
conservative approach makes the subject more comfortable because the potential risks of 
revealing personal information are so high.  Once again, unless the security researcher or 
their organization is trusted, the subjects are reluctant to participate.   
This discomfort and distrust point to the need to develop and expand the use of 
human performance modelling tools to predict the usability of the interface.  Cogtool did 
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correctly predict both the increased usability of the mobile security interface once the 
design principles were applied.  Cogtool also correctly documented even the improved 
security interface on mobile was not as easy to use as the worst desktop.  The human 
performance modelling can provide a measure without revealing the personal security 
traits/attitudes/behaviors of individual subjects.   
5.3.1 Gaps in the Literature 
As discussed in 2.4, current research does not provide design direction security-
usability for mobile separate from desktop.  The results of this research show that the 
design principles proposed did improve the usability of the security interface on mobile.  
The high success rate of users in navigating the revised interface, and the positive SUS 
rating demonstrates this.   
Prior research does not examine the true cost of the keystroke equivalent on the 
mobile platform.  Though the accuracy of Cogtool as a predictor of difficulty was 
documented on both desktop and mobile, a comparison of the difficulty of repeatedly 
using the same security interface on both platforms has not been done.  The results show 
that input of security information using a keystroke equivalent is almost three times more 
difficult than on the desktop.  Breaking down the Cogtool measure into the constrained 
resources used on the mobile keyboard equivalent revealed the hidden cognitive load on 
each stroke that was not decreased by repetition, and not caused by lack of recall.  The 
nature of touchscreen interaction with no haptic cues like a physical keyboard, and no 
development of body memory makes each and every keystroke sequence as difficult as 
the one previous.   
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Previous research has focused on the use of SUS data to determine user 
perception of usability.  The generalized nature of the SUS questions does not provide 
specific guidance for what to change in a system like the Cogtool mapping to the design.  
Phase 1 and 2 provided clearer insight into what to consider for future directions than the 
Phase 3 data.  Having a metric to aim for (the Cogtool score for basic authentication on 
desktop) a method to measure (Cogtool), and specific actions to control/reduce (the 
actions that used the resources of power, form factor, user effort) is more attainable by 
the security designer than the checklist of principles.  Meeting a metric makes 
communicating the usability more concrete than an adjective like “good.”  
This research looks specifically at security input rather keyboard input in general 
on the mobile platform.  Security input for basic authentication differs from input for a 
text message because of the rules for strong passwords (Horcher & Tejay, 2009).  To 
prevent a dictionary attack to guess a password, users are encouraged to choose character 
sequences that are not typically typed (Topkara, Atallah, & Topkara, 2007).  Passwords 
that are easily typed by going across a row in in a keyboard (QWERTY) are also 
discouraged (Furnell, 2011).  Research to improve typing usability on the mobile device 
keyboard has focused on predictive text to reduce interaction time (Sandnes, 2015; Trinh, 
Waller, Vertanen, Kristensson, & Hanson, 2014).  Since strong passwords should fail 
predictive text criteria, these algorithms do not improve the accuracy of security input.  
Touchscreens also produce higher error rates during movement, and user familiarity does 
not improve accuracy (Orphanides & Nam, 2017). 
5.4 Recommendations  
In spite of receiving security advice suggesting the need to protect data, users still 
choose not to protect the data.  For instance, Herley observed that security advice is 
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getting increasingly complex without a clear positive cost-benefit trade-off for the 
additional effort expended by the user (Herley, 2009b).  In the absence of an independent 
measure of the effort, it is still possible that many users correctly perceive basic 
authentication as an unreasonable security hurdle to an application.  As an example,  
Harbach et al. empirically showed that in 27 days, the participants in their study spent an 
average of over an hour each day just unlocking their devices (Harbach, Von Zezschwitz, 
Fichtner, De Luca, & Smith, 2014). 
When listening to music or talking, individuals are more likely to look at their 
device  (Schwebel et al., 2012).  The danger of cognitive distraction from mobile phone 
use reduces situation awareness and  increases unsafe behavior (Nasar, Hecht, & Wener, 
2008).  Pedestrians are at greater risk for accidents, and crime victimization.  Every eyes-
on interaction decreases ability to ambulate due  to the need to divide attention between 
the screen and the surrounding environment (Laatar, Kachouri, Borji, Rebai, & Sahli, 
2017).   
The dropped head posture adopted by the user to see the screen affects  not only 
visibility of surroundings but also balance and gait (Kao, Higginson, Seymour, 
Kamerdze, & Higginson, 2015).  Dancers and figure skaters have long known the weight 
shift caused by a head dropped forward by looking at the ground is detrimental to balance 
(United States Figure Skating Association, 1998), even though the weight of the average 
human skull is only 10-11 pounds.  Eyes-on security input, such as basic authentication, 
requires both looking away from the environment to ensure authentication success, and a 
dropped head.  Disengagement from the environment while the user is in motion even as 
a pedestrian decreases usability and safety.   
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Distractions caused by mobile phone use while driving have clearly shown the 
connection between texting and traffic accidents (Lipovac, Đerić, Tešić, Andrić, & 
Marić, 2017).  In the United States, hands-on use of a mobile phone has been regulated in 
14 states and has resulted in a reduction of traffic accidents particularly for less-
experienced drivers  (Zhu, Rudisill, Heeringa, Swedler, & Redelmeier, 2016).  There is 
conflicting evidence on the impact of conversation as a distraction.  Drivers taking calls 
related to work experienced a higher level of distraction (Engelberg, Hill, Rybar, & Styer, 
2015), but those who were conversing had decreased levels of driver fatigue in a 
monotonous driving situation (Saxby, Matthews, & Neubauer, 2017). 
The damage done while driving is exacerbated by the distances travelled during 
the distraction, roughly 100 yards at 55 mph in 4 seconds (Muttart, Fisher, Knodler, & 
Pollatsek, 2007).  A typical pedestrian walks at 3 feet per second (Kao et al., 2015) 
amounting to a distance travelled of 12 feet.  In an urban setting with no barriers between 
pedestrians and traffic, plus other obstacles, 4 seconds is more than sufficient to move 
from safety to danger (Mwakalonge, Siuhi, & White, 2015).   
More complex typing tasks and greater memory recall tasks induce dual-task 
interference while walking (Lim, Amado, Sheehan, & Van Emmerik, 2015).  The higher 
the cognitive load required by input, the less cognition is available for safely navigating 
the surroundings. Research to improve typing usability on the mobile device keyboard 
has focused on predictive text to reduce interaction time (Sandnes, 2015; Trinh, Waller, 
Vertanen, Kristensson, & Hanson, 2014).  Since strong passwords should fail predictive 
text criteria, these algorithms do not improve the accuracy of security input.  
Touchscreens also produce higher error rates during movement, and user familiarity does 
not improve accuracy (Orphanides & Nam, 2017). 
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The lack of usability for security inputs on a touchscreen also points to a need for 
a better design of the touchscreen keyboard construct.  Previous work in this area has 
focused on auto-correction and predicting input (Al-Khalifa et al. 2014).  A security-input 
optimized keyboard may alleviate the issues that hamper the usability of touchscreen 
input, just as text-optimized keyboards improve text input usability (Bi et al. 2010).  The 
use of a security-optimized keyboard could be limited to security inputs in the design of 
an interface so as to not impact other uses of the keyboard. Alternate versions of 
keyboards are already triggered to ease entry of email addresses, URLs and other data 
(Hong et al. 2015). A similar technique could be used.   
Voice and haptic interfaces have improved to become a viable “eyes-off” option 
(Arif, Pahud, Hinckley, & Buxton, 2013).  The cognitive load on the mobile user can be 
reduced by collecting information about the user from the environment and processing 
with artificial intelligence to create conversational interaction (Harris, 2005).  Instead of 
turning a slab of glass into a bad keyboard, the design principles for usable security must 
conserve the constrained resources and exploiting the extended possibilities.   
Using GPS location to set the security level of the webapp was appreciated by the 
users.  No keyboard input was necessary, other than to name the location.  To get access 
to the most usable security mode, some users would set their current location as “safe”, 
and then delete the location after retrieving the desired security hints/clues.  This 
indicates a need for a time duration of security access.  Currently the norm for granting 
security access defaults to permanent access.  Designing an auto-expiration of 30 minutes 
as the default, with the option to select permanent access, would protect the user whose 
location may be safe at the time, but not perhaps later.  Similarly the user might choose to 
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designate a medical facility as safe for a time while assistance is being rendered, and then 
have access auto-expire.   
Several users suggested the use of pictures to remind themselves of passwords 
instead of text strings as their input to the webapp.  Others used speech to text capabilities 
as an alternative to the mobile keyboard.  For exceeding small screens, such as the 
smartwatch, one-handed security entry with eyes off is highly desirable.  Instead of trying 
to type, a series of timed taps could form a pattern for unlocking.  Similar to the 
passphrase, the user thinks of a rhythmic pattern or song to trigger recall of the 
authentication sequence.   
As options to the touchscreen keyboard for authentication, drawing a pattern and 
fingerprint reading have become popular.  Each of these options can be executed “eyes-
off” and in less than four seconds, making them safer for mobile authentication in 
motion.   
5.5 Summary 
 
In this chapter the results communicated in Chapter 4 were mapped to the 
research questions.  In response to research question 1, usability was shown to be a subset 
of security.  Good choices in security design lead to good choices for usability and vice 
versa.  In response to research question 2, the results showed that conserving the 
constrained resources identified on mobile (power, form factor, and user effort/cognitive 
load) did improve the usability of the security interface and the success rate of navigating 
security.  However, the comparison to the desktop platform, the improvement still did not 
match the usability level of the desktop equivalent.  The gaps in the literature identified in 
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the Chapter 2 literature were also mapped to the results.  In particular the cost of the 
keystroke and the difference between security and normal input have not been examined.  
Finally the future directions for research in this area are discussed based on the results of 
the research.   
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Appendix A - Use Cases Descriptions and Diagrams 
 The following four security-related tasks describe typical use of basic 
authentication.   
Task 1:  Login Attempt  
The login attempt task is mapped to the subject providing the typical basic 
authentication input of a UID and password.  This path leads to success when the user 
knows both the UID and the password. 
Task 2:  UID Recovery  
The UID recovery task is performed when the subject forgets the UID.  The 
artifact verifies if the UID provided by the user is valid.  If it is not valid, the appropriate 
message is displayed.  Since the UID is typically relatively public (Herley, 2009), as 
described earlier, the recovery by an email confirmation to account establishment email.  
UID recovery is only needed in a high risk location.  UID is pre-filled in low and medium 
risk locations. 
Task 3:  Password Reset 
The password reset task occurs when the subject cannot recall the password.  The 
user requests a reset and receives a temporary password sent to the email account used as 
the UID for this authentication.  The user must copy the temporary password and provide 
a new strong password.  The user is also prompted to create a password hint to allow 
potential recovery of the password in locations which are low risk. 
Task 4:  Password Recovery (Get hint)  
The password recovery task is only available at a low risk location.  It provides 
an avenue to successful authentication other than the password reset process.  The user 
sees the recall cue only if one was set when prompted during password change.  The 
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diagrams below shows the paths taken through the interface based on location mode.  
The four security tasks modelled in the CogTool appear along the path to authentication.  
 
Figure A 1.  Use case 1 – User Knows Password and UID  
      In the first case the user knows the both the UID and the password ( 
Figure A 1.  Use case 1 – User Knows Password and UID ).  This is the simplest path.  
The user successfully recalls the password and UID from memory, and also successfully 
manipulates the form factors of the equipment.   
 
Figure A 2.  Use case 2 – User knows password and not UID  
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  In use case 2 the user knows the password and not the UID.  For the security 
designs represented as Medium and Low risk there is no need of UID recovery because 
the UID is supplied to the user.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure A 3.  Use Case 3 – User knows UID and not password 
 
In use case 3 the user knows the UID and not the password (Figure A 3.  Use 
Case 3 – User knows UID and not password).  For the security designs represented as 
Medium and High there is no option of password recovery because a password hint is 
only available in Low risk mode.  In Medium mode the password recovery is presented 
but the user will not receive a password clue because of the risk level.  Medium and High 
designs must go through the password reset to achieve success, which requires much 
more manipulation of the security interface than the password recovery.  The Low risk 
mode displays a password clue which allows the user to retrieve the password from 
memory using cued recall instead of the free recall that is the only option available in 
Medium and High risk designs.  
In use case 4 the user doesn’t know the UID or the password (Figure A 4).  In the security 
interface design for High risk, the user must recover the UID and reset the password to 
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achieve successful authentication.  In the security interface design for Medium risk the 
UID is supplied so only the password reset task is needed to achieve successful 
authentication.  Finally the security interface design for Low risk mode only uses the 
password recovery task, similar to use case 3.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure A 4.  Use Case 4 - User does not know UID or Password 
 
Each security task receives a CogTool score indicating its difficulty in seconds 
elapsed.  The score for each security mode will be based on adding up the score of the 
security tasks that make up the path from choice of site to success in site access.  
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Appendix B - CogTool Wireframes  
CogTool is an open source, general purpose user interface prototyping tool 
developed at Carnegie-Mellon University.  It uses a human performance model to 
automatically evaluate how efficiently a skilled user can complete a task.  In this study it 
is used to measure the efficiency of three versions of basic authentication on both desktop 
and mobile devices.   
    To use Cogtool a designer creates a storyboard of a design.  In this study images 
of the actual screens were used to produce the story board.  The tasks included in 
navigating the security interface were demonstrated by interacting with the storyboard 
like the software.  As a result CogTool creates a baseline of the current version of basic 
authentication on mobile and desktop, and measures the improvements made by 
conserving constrained resources on mobile. 
 
Figure B 1.  High Risk Desktop Design in CogTool 
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Figure B 2.  Medium Risk Desktop Design in CogTool 
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Figure B 3.  Low Risk Desktop Design in CogTool 
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Figure B 4.  High Risk Mobile Design   
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Figure B 5.  Medium Risk Mobile Design  
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Figure B 6.  Low Risk Mobile Design   
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Appendix C – Task List for Study Participants  
 The study participants received links to a web page with instructions to perform a 
task.  There was a signup task, nine tasks interacting with the Get My CLUE app, and one 
task filling out the post-study survey.  The links were delivered via email and text 
message.   
Group 1 – Add a Website 
1. Sign In to Get My Clue (above) and complete the tasks on this list  
2. Click the button below to go to Get My Clue 
3. Click on Menu --> Websites  
4. Click on  
5. Choose Select Website from the list 
6. Choose a website off the list 
7. Hit submit to see it on your list of websites 
Group 2 - Add userid and Passwords to a Website 
1. Sign In to Get My Clue (above) and complete the tasks on this list  
2. Click the button below to go to Get My Clue 
3. Click on Menu --> Websites  
4. Click on any website from the list 
5. Add a userid clue and a password clue if prompted. Then click on the website 
again  
Group 3 – The home screen carousel  
1. Sign In to Get My Clue (above) and complete the tasks on this list  
2. Click the button below to go to Get My Clue 
3. Click on large icon of any web site in the carousel  
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4. Click on to see a userid hint  
5. Click on to see a userid hint  
6. Click on to see a password hint  
7. Click Menu --> Sign out.  
8. Click the button Confirm Sign out.  
Group 4 - Change your Password 
1. Type the wrong password above and click on Sign In (above)  
2. Click on to see a password hint 
3. Click on Forgot Password  
4. Check your email for the temporary password and copy it into the screen  
5. Put in a new password and hit Change Password  
6. if you do not have a password hint, you will see a prompt to provide a password 
hint (You will be prompted to do this every time you start a session until you set a 
hint) 
7. Click the button below to go to Get My Clue 
Group 5 – Set a new Password Hint  
1. Sign In to Get My Clue (above) and complete the tasks on this list  
2. Since you changed your password you might need a new hint. Click below to 
Change Get My CLUE Password Hint 
3. Put in a new password hint for Get My CLUE 
4. Click Add Get My CLUE Password Hint to update your password clue. 
5. Click the button below to go to Get My Clue 
Group 6 – Add categories to determine risk for websites  
1. Sign In to Get My Clue (above) and complete the tasks on this list  
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2. Click the button below to go to Get My Clue 
3. Click on Menu --> Websites  
4. Click on Search 
5. Type part of a category name or website name. The website list will show only 
the sites that meet your search.  
Group 7 – Add password hint  
1. Sign In to Get My Clue (above) and complete the tasks on this list  
2. Click below to Change Get My CLUE Password Hint 
3. Put in a new password hint for Get My CLUE 
4. Click Add Get My CLUE Password Hint to update your password clue. 
5. Click the button below to go to Get My Clue 
Group 8 - Add locations and use web app in different locations 
1. Sign In to Get My Clue (above) and complete the tasks on this list  
2. Click the button below to go to Get My Clue 
3. Click on Menu --> Locations  
4. Click to add a new location 
5. Choose a risk level for your current location  
6. Type a short name for your location  
7. Type a description for your location  
8. Click Submit new to add your current location. If you are at a location already in 
your locations, you will see an error message 
9. Click on Menu --> Websites  
10. Choose any website and click on it  
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Group 9a – Use the web application in a new location.  User must be in a new location  
1. Sign In to Get My Clue (above) and complete the tasks on this list  
2. Make sure you are in a location different from the previous task 
3. Click the button below to go to Get My Clue 
4. Click on Menu --> Locations  
5. Click to add a new location 
6. Add your current location as medium risk 
7. Remember to Submit New for the new location  
8. Refresh your screen  
9. Click on Menu -- > Websites Notice that the password clue does not appear  
10. Choose any website and click on it  
Group 9b – Repeat previous task group in a new location   
1. Sign In to Get My Clue (above) and complete the tasks on this list  
2. Make sure you are in a location different from the previous task 
3. Click the button below to go to Get My Clue 
4. Click on Menu --> Locations  
5. Click to add a new location 
6. Add your current location as medium risk  
7. Remember to Submit New for new location 
8. Refresh your screen  
9. Click on Menu -- > Websites Notice that the password clue does not appear  
10. Choose any website and click on it   
122 
 
  
 
Appendix D – Experimental Procedure Checklist 
1. Have potential subjects fill out the pre-study survey from Appendix E.  The 
informed consent form is included in the survey.  Subjects who do not give 
consent are removed from the study at this point and their data discarded.  
2. Extract data from pre-study survey on websites commonly used by the subject and 
pre-load information into the CLUE web application to decrease the configuration 
needed by the subject before achieving any meaningful usage. 
3. Add subject email provided after consent to the data table listing emails allowed 
to use the web application.  
4. Send email and text message to the potential subject with a link to create an 
account in the Get My CLUE app.   
5. After confirming the subject signed up by checking the list of users in Firebase 
authentication, add the subject to the list of subjects being directed through the 
tasks of the study.   
6. Send a text and email daily to direct the subject to perform the nine groups of 
tasks listed in Appendix C.  Group 9 involved 2 emails and task messages to 
direct the subject through tasks at different points in the day.   
7. Send the subject a link in email and text to complete the final survey. 
8. Send the subject a link in email and text to request a gift card.   
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Appendix E – Pre-Study Questionnaire 
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Appendix F - CogTool Mapping Data 
 CogTool measures for the security interface designs created using the design 
principles that conserve the constrained resources appear below.  
 
Figure F 1.  CogTool Measures for Get My CLUE, high Desktop is current norm 
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Appendix G – Data Definitions of Firebase Usage Data 
The data for Phase 2 was collected using a webapp written in AngularJS 
framework.  The data was store in the NoSQL database Firebase provided by Google.  
The data was extracted from Firebase in CSV files and loaded to Excel and SPSS for 
analysis.   
Common Fields 
Field name Type Description 
transID String Firebase generated unique transaction identifier 
firebaseUID String Unique identifier for Firebase user created when user 
registers 
startedAt Timestamp Time in milliseconds from January 1, 1960.  Recorded 
when action starts 
Email Email  Email address of the user (used before FirebaseUID is 
generated)  
endedAt Timestamp Time in milliseconds from January 1, 1960.   
url URL Universal Resource Locator for a web page 
security_mode String High, medium, or low.  High is the control condition 
Startdate Timestamp Time and date an event started DOW MMM DD YYYY 
HH:MM:SS  
Userid String User identifier (email) 
userkey String User identifier BTOA 
category String Category for the transaction (depends on table) 
Appname String Application name 
 
Data Source Tables From FireBase 
o answers  - answers to the SUS survey 
 Unique Transaction ID 
  answer -  
  answerval 
  email 
  firebaseUID 
  qname 
  startedAt    
o clues – successful uses of the app to retrieve clues based on security mode 
 Unique Transaction ID 
  appname 
  category 
  firebaseUID 
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  security_mode 
  startdate 
  startedAt 
  url 
  userid 
  userkey 
o comments – comments made at end of post-study survey 
 Unique Transaction ID 
  answer 
  email 
  firebaseUID 
  startedAt 
o users – information about user approved locations 
 userkey 
  email 
  firebaseUID 
  geofire – GeoFire info on locations 
  locations – descriptive info on locations 
  nickname – location nickname 
  pwc – password clue for GetMyCLUE 
  websites 
o gmcClues – uses of clues to access apps 
 Unique Transaction ID 
  appname 
  category 
  firebaseUID 
  security_mode 
  startdate 
  startedAt 
  url 
  userid 
  userkey 
o gmcClues – session information on use of the GetMyCLUE app 
 Unique Transaction ID 
  appname 
  category 
  firebaseUID 
  security_mode 
  startdate 
  startedAt 
  url 
  userid 
  userkey 
o resetpw – password resets for CLUE 
  Unique Transaction ID 
  appname 
  startdate 
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  startedAt 
  userid 
  userkey 
o sessions –session information for CLUE 
  Unique Transaction ID 
  enddate 
  endedAt 
  firebaseUID 
  mobileDevice 
  startdate 
  startedAt 
  userid 
  userkey 
o taskusage – CLUE usage for specific tasks 
  Unique Transaction ID 
  appname 
  category 
  firebaseUID 
  security_mode 
  startdate 
  startedAt 
  url 
  userid 
  userkey 
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Appendix H – Recruitment and Demographic Data 
This appendix includes information about both the potential pool of subjects and 
the pool that proceeded to the study.  The findings discuss the difficulties of getting 
participation in security research.  The high attrition rate of subjects demonstrates this.  
Unlike typical information systems research, the women outnumber the men two to one.  
This is due to the convenience sample containing, among others, a large group of 
technical women.   
 
Figure H 1.  Gender Distribution of Potential Subjects 
 
Total
Female 78
Male 38
Prefer not to answer 2
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2
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Gender Distribution of Potential Subjects
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Figure H 2.  Technology Expertise vs. Gender for Subjects   
 
 
Figure H 3.  Technology Expertise vs. age for Subjects    
fair good very good excellent
2 3 4 5
Female 2 7 11 6
Male 1 8 6 2
Prefer not to answer 1
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38-47
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48-57
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good - 3 41% 20% 0% 20% 50%
excellent - 5 0% 80% 33% 40% 25%
very good - 4 48% 0% 67% 20% 25%
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Appendix I – Data from usage of Webapp CLUE 
“High mobile” and “High desktop” represent the current norm.  The effort conserved is 
the difference between the effort consumed by a security task in control mode and the 
effort consumed in the revised mode (Table I 2).  There were 1700 separate uses of the 
webapp to navigate the security interface.   
Table I 1.  Constrained Resource Consumed by Security Task and Risk 
Row Labels Clue  
High 
Mobile 
Med 
Mobile 
Low 
Mobile 
High 
Desktop 
Med 
Desktop 
Low 
Desktop 
form factor   27.6 14.6 11.9 30.5 17.2 14.1 
Logon 
Attempt URL 16.4 7.2 7.2 14 7.2 7.2 
Password 
recovery Clue 3.7 3.7 1 5 5 1.9 
UID 
recovery Userid 3.8 0 0 6.5 0 0 
Password 
reset  3.7 3.7 3.7 5 5 5 
power   8 6.5 4.5 6 4.5 3 
Logon 
Attempt URL 1.5 0.5 0.5 1.5 0.5 0.5 
Password 
recovery Clue 3 3 1 2 2 0.5 
UID 
recovery Userid 0.5 0 0 0.5 0 0 
Password 
reset  3 3 3 2 2 2 
user effort   144 111.6 73.2 54 48 32.4 
Logon 
Attempt URL 50.4 25.2 25.2 9.6 7.2 7.2 
Password 
recovery Clue 43.2 43.2 4.8 20.4 20.4 4.8 
UID 
recovery Userid 7.2 0 0 3.6 0 0 
Password 
reset  43.2 43.2 43.2 20.4 20.4 20.4 
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Table I 2.  Seconds of Time Conserved Using the Revised Design.   
 
 
 
 
  
  Clue   
High 
Mobile 
Med 
Mobile 
Low 
Mobile 
High 
Desktop 
Med 
Desktop 
Low 
Desktop 
form factor  
Logon 
Attempt URL 0 9.2 9.2 0 6.8 6.8 
Password 
recovery Clue 0 0 2.7 0 0 3.1 
UID 
recovery Userid 0 3.8 3.8 0 6.5 6.5 
Password 
reset  0 0 0 0 0 0 
power  
Logon 
Attempt URL 0 1 1 0 1 1 
Password 
recovery Clue 0 0 2 0 0 1.5 
UID 
recovery Userid 0 0.5 0.5 0 0.5 0.5 
Password 
reset  0 0 0 0 0 0 
user effort  
Logon 
Attempt URL 0 25.2 25.2 0 2.4 2.4 
Password 
recovery Clue 0 0 38.4 0 0 15.6 
UID 
recovery Userid 0 7.2 7.2 0 3.6 3.6 
Password 
reset  0 0 0 0 0 0 
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Appendix J – Calculations for System Usability Scale  
 This appendix contains all the calculations for changing the raw SUS score to a 
percentile rank for the five different categories of software.  All the categories could be 
used to describe the CLUE webapp.  Though the actual SUS score doesn’t change, the 
same score varies in how it compares to other products in a category.   
Figure J 1.  SUS Calculation CLUE vs All ProductsFigure  
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Figure J 2.  SUS Score for GMC vs. Business Software    
 
 
Figure J 3.  SUS Score for GMC vs. Consumer SoftwareFigure J 1.   
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Figure J 4.  SUS Score for GMC vs. Websites.  
 
 
Figure J 5.  SUS Score for GMC vs. Cellphones   
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Appendix K – IRB Memo 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
MEMORANDUM 
 
To:  Ann-Marie Horcher 
 
From:  Ling Wang, Ph.D. 
                        Institutional Review Board     
  
          
NOVA SOUTHEASTERN 
UNIVERSITY  
Office of Grants and Contracts 
Institutional Review Board 
 
 
Signature 
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Date:  Dec. 8, 2014 
 
Re: Evaluation of a mobile security Interface designed with security usability 
principles to conserve constrained resources      
 
 
IRB Approval Number:  wang07151401 
 
I have reviewed the above-referenced research protocol at the center level.  Based on the 
information provided, I have determined that this study is exempt from further IRB 
review.  You may proceed with your study as described to the IRB.  As principal 
investigator, you must adhere to the following requirements: 
 
1) CONSENT:  If recruitment procedures include consent forms these must be 
obtained in such a manner that they are clearly understood by the subjects and the 
process affords subjects the opportunity to ask questions, obtain detailed answers 
from those directly involved in the research, and have sufficient time to consider 
their participation after they have been provided this information.  The subjects 
must be given a copy of the signed consent document, and a copy must be placed 
in a secure file separate from de-identified participant information.  Record of 
informed consent must be retained for a minimum of three years from the 
conclusion of the study. 
2) ADVERSE REACTIONS:  The principal investigator is required to notify the 
IRB chair and me (954-262-5369 and 954-262-2020 respectively) of any adverse 
reactions or unanticipated events that may develop as a result of this study.  
Reactions or events may include, but are not limited to, injury, depression as a 
result of participation in the study, life-threatening situation, death, or loss of 
confidentiality/anonymity of subject.  Approval may be withdrawn if the problem is 
serious. 
3) AMENDMENTS:  Any changes in the study (e.g., procedures, number or types 
of subjects, consent forms, investigators, etc.) must be approved by the IRB prior to 
implementation.  Please be advised that changes in a study may require further 
review depending on the nature of the change.  Please contact me with any 
questions regarding amendments or changes to your study. 
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The NSU IRB is in compliance with the requirements for the protection of human 
subjects prescribed in Part 46 of Title 45 of the Code of Federal Regulations (45 CFR 
46) revised June 18, 1991. 
 
Cc: Protocol File            
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